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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Rarely do we see a high ranking military officer comment on political affairs, but on a press 
conference on the 17
th
 of March the top U.S. General, Martin Dempsey made it clear what he 
thought about the Russian sales of advanced cruise missiles to war-torn Syria. The shipments 
of these weapons are "ill-timed" and "very unfortunate", according to the General (Voice of 
America, 2013). Untraditional maybe, but as Joint Chief of Staff, he probably saw it as his 
responsibility – considering international pressure for military intervention against the regime 
– to warn about the possible consequences of equipping Assad with the so-called “ship-killer” 
missiles. Last year Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made sharp statements with the same 
concerns (Stearns, 2012). Even more concerned were Israel which early in 2013 launched 
attacks inside Syria on convoys allegedly transporting some of these weapons to Hezbollah in 
Lebanon (Pleitgen & Sidner, 2013). So why is Russia still selling arms to Syria? 
 
This thesis will investigate the global arms trade and look for patterns that suggest second-tier 
state balancing. The research question then is; do second-tier states use arms exports in order 
to balance U.S. hegemony? I argue that the arms transfers to Syria is with intent, the intent is 
not profit but balancing against the global hegemony of the United States. Together with 
China, Russia as a second-tier power unsatisfied with the current unipolar world order uses 
the arms trade as a foreign policy tool to balance against the United States. The thesis 
analyses the arms trade of Russia and China from 2000 to 2012. The year 2000 is a natural 
starting point for investigating new trends in balancing politics. 2000 is also the year that all 
Russian arms exports are subjected by the federal agency of Rosoboroneksport. A key point 
for the analysis has been to focus on what kinds of arms that are sold, rather than just the 
amount. By transferring advanced weapon systems to states that challenge the U.S., the 
second-tier states can hinder, frustrate, strain, exhaust, and ultimately challenge the global 
hegemony of the United States. I argue that the arms trade is one tool of many in the strategic 
toolbox of counterbalancing.  
 
First the thesis looks into the overall debate of balancing, from whom and under which 
circumstances we may expect balancing behaviour. I also establish the current state of the 
unipolar world and the relative capabilities of the United States compared to Russia and 
China. Secondly, I investigate how arms trading can fit into the debate of balancing. Thirdly, 
in the empirical analysis the arms trade of Russia and China is investigated, and its potential 
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effects on the United States are analysed. The most significant cases are isolated and 
presented to exemplify the general picture of the second-tier state’s arms trade. As indicated 
earlier, I make findings in the analysis of Russia’s and China’s arms trade to suggest that it is 
part of a balancing strategy. Results obtained from analysing the historical development of the 
profits generated by the arms trade on a global scale but for Russia and China in particular, 
challenge the previously recognised motivations for these sales. The arms trade data show that 
for the 2000s, Russia has endured the economic landslide hitting their arms industry as a 
consequence of the end of the Cold War. Last year, Russia set a new record for revenues 
generated from the arms trade, showing that they no longer have to sell “everything to 
everyone” just to survive (Reuters, 2012).  
 
Researching possible actions of second-tier state balancing is important because its effects 
have great potential for affecting the world we live in. History has also shown that periods of 
transition can be violent, as great power politics often are. Balancing actions against a 
hegemon taken by rising second-tier powers can have many implications, as Zakaria warns: 
 
"The rise of China and Russia’s expanding world ambitions will complicate existing power 
relations in many ways. Great power conflict is something that the world has not seen since 
the Cold War. If we were to return to great power conflict, all the troubles we worry about 
today – terrorism, North Korea, Iran – would pale in comparison. It would mean arms races, 
strict border control, local conflicts, rivalries among allies and client-states, and other 
problems associated with the last great power conflict” (Zakaria, 2008: 125).  
 
If full out war between the second-tier powers is no longer likely because of nuclear weapons, 
other strategic weapons may still be important.  “Nuclear weapons alone do not make states 
into great powers” (Waltz, 1993: 52). The importance of power projection and the ability to 
deny power projection within one’s own area of influence is likely to continue to keep hard 
power at the top shelf for the years to come. But with new times come new ideas, and the 
theory or category of soft power opens new possibilities for finer understandings of 
international politics today. Brooks and Wohlforth warn against interpreting too swiftly every 
action opposing U.S. interests as balancing behaviour (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005, 2008). 
Yet, there has since 2003 been an increase in signs of realignment in the international balance 
of power. There are evidence, argue some (e.g. Layne, 2006b; Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005), that 
states follow their own perceived interests and take action to restrain the United States 
(Erickson & Goldstein, 2006; Wagner, 2010: 27). It is uncertain whether the arms trade of the 
second-tier states in general should be labelled as hard or soft balancing, but it is certain that 
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the second-tier states are transferring weapons to each other and to third parties; in spite of the 
clear harmful effect this has on the United States and its effort to sustain global hegemony. I 
have chosen to follow the definitions of Pape, who maintain that military alliances and 
“transfers of military technology to U.S. opponents” should be considered hard balancing 
(Pape, 2005: 9), while soft balancing is “actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military 
preponderance but that […] frustrate, and undermine […] U.S. military policies” (Pape, 2005: 
10). What my analysis show, is that some second-tier states have an arms trade with patterns 
that differs to a great extent from the others. The thesis evaluates which of the second-tier 
states that is likely to engage in balancing behaviour against the United States. The Russian 
Federation and the People’s Republic of China were found to be the best candidates. These 
two countries are also the two major powers that differs the most from the rest in case of the 
arms trade. No other states are to the same extent trading major conventional arms with 
China, Syria, Iran, Venezuela or Sudan. And no other states than Russia and China are 
transferring advanced potentially game-changing weapons systems to these states.  
 
Transferring military technology to formal allies is per definition hard balancing, and there 
are few other explanations for actively increasing the military capabilities of states like Iran 
and Syria. The global arms trade is overall motivated by supply and demand, but a state can 
still profit without dealing with Iran. One might think that getting a bad tone from the U.S. 
Secretary of State and subsequent cool relations would outweigh the profit from Russia’s 
arms trade with Syria, but still the sales went through. To find an answer to this puzzle, I 
analysed Russia’s sales to Syria from 2011 when the civil war started and found that the arms 
that Assad’s regime ordered from Moscow for the most part were not your usual “put-down-
a-rebellion weaponry” (like armoured cars, tanks, light aircraft and artillery), but rather 
advanced air and coastal missile batteries for territorial defence. I then looked back at one of 
the other revolutions of the “Arab spring”. The uprising in Libya was especially violent and 
although the rebels had a good start, Muammar Gadhafi’s loyal forces were at the end close to 
beating them. The only thing that stopped him was a UN sanctioned multinational military 
intervention that eventually destroyed his forces. With this perspective, the Russian arms 
transfers show themselves with quite different colours. 
 
Another example of interesting motives behind the arms trade is the Russian sales to India. 
Here Moscow is apparently working hard to nurture and increase the relationship. There 
seems to be no limit of what arms New Delhi can order from the remains of her old friend. 
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The analysis show that although profits may be considerable, the Russians do not need to sell 
arms to India, but none the less they do. Based on the general pattern and specific cases, I 
understand Moscow’s motivation of the arms trade with New Delhi in part as soft balancing 
against the influence of Washington. It is certain that the U.S. wants India as a regional 
partner, and arms cooperation is a normal part of such relationships.  
More troubling still for the United States is Russia’s extensive arms transfers to China. 
Though the sheer amount by itself may be interesting, the real importance lies in the specific 
weapons and their capabilities. The analysis showed that Beijing have been ordering advanced 
weapons with specific capabilities they cannot get elsewhere. Especially noteworthy are the 
weapons with anti-access/area denial capabilities. China’s acquisition of these weapons, 
which are specialized in obstructing the power projection of other states, is a major concern 
for the U.S. Department of Defense. The new assets of the Chinese forces means that the U.S. 
aircraft carrier groups in the western Pacific, and U.S. air force bases in Okinawa, South 
Korea and Guam can be targeted. The strategic aim of Beijing would be, with their own 
military power, to make U.S. power projection in Asia riskier and more costly, so that states 
in the region no longer can rely on it for total protection. If the U.S. military presence is 
seriously challenged, China will also be able to fulfil its threats towards Taiwan, if the 
renegade province ever declares independence. It is possible for China to counterbalance the 
U.S. regionally without having the hegemonic power projection capabilities that the U.S. 
does. To overcome this challenge is mentioned as a primary mission for the U.S. Armed 
Forces (Department of Defense, 2012). It is clear that the Russian arms transfers to China 
from the 2000s are much more than just profit. Though the real extent of the cooperation is 
debated, Moscow and Beijing are in fact military allies in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, which is yet to exploit its full potential.   
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Chapter 2: Balancing under Unipolarity? 
This chapter will explain what balancing is and how the international system influences the 
states into balancing behaviour. The researchers divide themselves into two different 
standpoints concerning balancing against the United States and the endurance of its 
hegemony. Some argue that the U.S. is a benevolent hegemon with no need for other states to 
fear, while other scholars maintain that a state with hegemonic powers is unpredictable, and 
that the other states want to limit its damage potential. The chapter starts with clarifying the 
global distribution of power. 
 
In the study of international politics, theories like structural realism and the more developed 
balance of power theory follows the basic assumption that the international system is 
anarchic, that is, that power and coercion are not monopolized by some form of world 
government. Because every state wants to retain their position in the international system, 
they are faced with the logic of taking care of themselves. It is a system of self-help (Waltz, 
1979: 107). To maintain their relative position in the system, states must balance against 
stronger states by improving their own relative capabilities. They will try to improve their 
relative capabilities either by internal means through rearmament, or by external means which 
include the establishment of military alliances. In the words of Waltz, “overwhelming power 
repels and leads others to balance against it” (Waltz, 2000: 2). However, there is not a perfect 
consensus among researchers of what balancing really is, or how it works. As Randall 
Schweller writes, “Although arguably the most frequently used term in the field of 
international relations, balancing remains an ambiguous concept” (Schweller, 2004: 166). 
This thesis will investigate the global arms trade and look for patterns that suggest wheter or 
not second-tier states are balancing against the hegemon.   
 
A Unipolar World 
The systemic structure of the international system is the centerpiece of the theory of structural 
realism. One of the major scholars asserting structural realism, Waltz is generally credited 
with the modern understandings of power polarity in the world system. The polarity of the 
international system reflects how power is distributed among the states. “To be politically 
pertinent, power has to be defined in terms of the distribution of capabilities. To use power is 
to apply one’s capabilities in an attempt to change someone else’s behavior in certain ways” 
(Waltz, 1979: 192-193). As it is clear from Waltz’s definition, power can have different 
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manifestations, traditionally military force and economic strength are viewed as power 
resources. Population and political potential are also power factors. The world in 1914 is the 
traditional example of a multipolar system with multiple great states, roughly equal in power. 
The Second World War destroyed Germany and Japan as major powers, left Europe beaten 
and broken, and power were now only distributed between the United States and the 
prevailing Soviet Union. The world had become bipolar. This situation captured the globe in 
an all-inclusive standoff between the two superpowers, known as the Cold War. After one of 
the two superpowers that made up the substance of the bipolar world dissolved in 1991, the 
other was left as the sole super power in the world. For more than two decades the United 
States has been the ever powerful survivor of the Cold War and it has been without real 
competition since the fall of the Soviet Union – an unmatched giant in the world.  
 
The current state of the international system shows a unipolar distribution of power, that some 
say is unprecedented. It really does not matter if one believes the unipolar world and U.S. 
hegemony of today can be compared with the Roman Empire, the British Empire or nothing 
at all. U.S. hegemony today means that the United States is the pole where power is 
concentrated, in fact so much power is concentrated in the favour of the United States that no 
other state or group of states can match it. The nature of the unipol induces many of the other 
states to bandwagon and follow the lead of the United States because they can benefit from its 
primacy. In addition, the over-concentration of hard military power in favour of the U.S. 
makes it hard and possibly quite dangerous for the other states to counterbalance. This is 
generally accepted among researchers as the reason for traditionally hard balancing being a 
rare event in today’s world. Military forces and assets are usually described as a state’s “hard 
power”. Hard balancing is thus the process of countering military power with military power. 
Researchers like Pape and Paul  focus on how the other states can use alternative methods to 
balance against the hegemon (Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005). The most established form of 
alternative balancing is called “soft balancing”. Soft balancing refers to the same process of 
countering power, but with other means than military force. However, the new forms of 
counterbalancing have yet to create a new constellation of power in the international system. 
“That unipolarity has not given way to a multipolar distribution of power, however, does not 
mean there has been an absence of balancing behaviour by other states” (Layne, 2006b: 29).  
 
There are two ways to show U.S. hegemony today. One is to measure and compare the 
military and economic powers of states, which will reveal convincing facts like that the 
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number of U.S. aircraft carriers is equal to the total number of aircraft carriers in the rest of 
the world combined. More significantly, in 2012 the United States alone accounted for 40 per 
cent of the world’s total military expenditures (Perlo-Freeman, Sköns, Solmirano, & Wilandh, 
2013: 2).  
 
Table 1. Showing military expenditure and percentage share of GDP, of the top five 
spending states (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2013) 
Rank Country Military Spending ($US b.) Percentage of 
GDP 
1 USA 682 4,4 
2 China 166 2,0 
3 Russia 90,7 4,4 
4 UK 60,8 2,5 
5 Japan 59,3 1,0 
 
The other way to observe todays U.S. hegemony is to follow the history back to when the 
place as world leader was shared with the Soviet Union (Kugler & Organski, 1989). The 
result of the Second World War was a bipolar world with two giants by and large dividing the 
world between them, leading into the Cold War. The Cold War ended when the Soviet Union 
collapsed and left the United States as the sole superpower in the world. This sole superpower 
now became a hegemon in a unipolar world. “Since the Soviet Union's disappearance, no 
other great power has emerged to challenge U.S. preponderance”  (Layne, 2006b: 12). The 
U.S. has also had the interest in and will to keep the favourable status quo through its foreign 
policy. All the U.S. presidents since the fall of the Soviet Union – George H.W. Bush, Bill 
Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama – have pursued a grand strategy that includes 
the goal of hindering the emergence of a state challenging the U.S. hegemony (Layne, 2006b).  
The U.S. hegemony is a matter of policy concern, and shows that the United States is aware 
of the consequences of balancing and is taking steps to counter it.  
 
U.S. Hegemony and the Global Distribution of Power 
Hegemony is a bout hard raw power. The most common definition of hegemonic power 
focuses on military power, and is by Mearsheimer defined as a condition which “no other 
state has the wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it" (Mearsheimer, 2001:40). But the 
basis of U.S. power and hegemony was not necessarily its hard power, it was its “remarkably 
favorable geopolitical position” (Walt, 2011: 1). With all potential rivals situated behind huge 
stretches of oceans, the United States have never really had to worry about foreign invasion. 
The United States maintains today a military force that is more powerful than any other 
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(SIPRI, 2011). The United States’ blue-water navy is, according to Work “superior to all 
others combined” (Work, 2005: 16). A blue-water navy is the traditional power projecting 
tool of great powers, and reveals that the United States both have the capabilities and the 
intentions to utilize these capabilities to maintain their current position as the leading world 
power. In addition to a blue-water navy that is similar in domination to the British fleet at its 
height, the U.S. has by far the largest capabilities in the modern form of power projection. For 
where the British 18
th
 and 19
th
 century navy could use force no longer than their guns’ limited 
range determined, the U.S. can reach anywhere with their aircraft. U.S. aircraft can reach 
every place on the globe, either with fighter aircraft sent from an aircraft carrier off the coast, 
a surveillance plane refuelled in air or a long-range bomber with take-off in the Mid-West 
with non-stop flight across the globe (Posen, 2003). The latter, for example, were used in 
early April 2013 as a show of force against North Korea in the midst of the nuclear crisis. 
Furthermore, the United States have the most advanced nuclear programme, capable of 
launching both first and second strikes successfully. Tellingly, their research and development 
budget is 80 per cent of the total defence budget of China, the most obvious future competitor 
of the U.S. (SIPRI, 2011). It is then safe to say, “The post–Cold War international system is 
thus unipolar” (Monteiro, 2011).  
 
A true hegemon also has economic supremacy in the international system and has a 
preponderance of material resources (Layne, 2006b: 11). Additionally, hegemony is about the 
power ambition of the leading state. According to Gilpin, “a hegemon acts self-interestedly to 
safeguard its security, economic, and ideological interests”(Gilpin, 1981: 29-30). As a third 
point, hegemony is of course about polarity. The hegemon enjoys overpowering resources in 
military and economic power compared to the other states in the international system, and 
therefore the system is unipolar. Hegemony succeeds in the international system when "one 
state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and 
willing to do so" (Keohane & Nye Jr., 1977: 44). But since no state has ever completely 
controlled the international system, hegemony is more of a relative than an absolute concept. 
The relative concept is important because it explains how we can call the United States a 
hegemon but also acknowledge that the hegemon has been unable to suppress the insurgency 
in Afghanistan or denied North Korea a nuclear program. The hegemon is not necessary 
omnipotent; there are still limits to its power and its ability to reach its goals with this power. 
Researchers like Layne see the United States as a hegemon because, “In international politics, 
the United States does not get all that it wants all of the time. But it gets most of what it wants 
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an awful lot of the time, and it affects other states far more than other states affect it” (Layne, 
2006b: 12).  
 
That the bipolar Cold War should come to such an abrupt ending two decades ago was a real 
surprise to most scholars. Until then, there had been little thought on the possibilities of a 
unipolar world. But today there is much literature on the subject, and from the start there were 
two areas of focus: the peacefulness and the durability of the unipolar system. The 
peacefulness of the unipolar system is a question that will not be covered here. In the 1990s 
the common argument for example presented by Krauthammer was that the unipolar moment 
was just a moment, and would not last for long (Krauthammer, 1990). As a representative and 
lodestar of many structural realists, Waltz argued that the systemic balance of world power 
would soon be re-established by other rising powers.  
 
Wohlforth (Wohlforth, 1999) was perhaps one of the first scholars to present theory that 
suggested that the U.S. unipolarity would not soon end, but on the contrary would endure for 
decades to come. Wohlforth noted how the nature of the unipolar system generated incentives 
for cooperation for stability and gave the United States initiatives to engage in global security 
to maintain the system, thus limiting the possibilities of competitor states to emerge 
(Wohlforth, 1999: 7-8, 38). In his book World Out of Balance: International Relations and 
the Challenge of American Primacy co-written with Brooks, Wohlforth further develops his 
arguments and stands out as one of the more influential perspectives in the debate (Brooks & 
Wohlforth, 2008). The question of the durability of the unipolar world we see today is 
constantly up for debate. Researchers like Wohlforth, Kagan, Ikenberry and Zakaria 
(Ikenberry, 2004; Kagan, 2012; Zakaria, 2008), argue that U.S. supremacy will likely 
continue for a long time. Layne, Pape and Walt represents scholars taking the other point of 
view, and do not see the unipolar world order to last for more than decades (Layne, 1993, 
2006b; Pape, 2005; Walt, 2011). Those who expect a change in the unipolar world system 
often see China as the prime challenger to the U.S. predominance. Together with the financial 
crises that began in 2008, the military expeditions of Afghanistan and Iraq have seriously 
strained the hegemon to the point that some, leaning upon Kennedy’s argument (Kennedy, 
1987b) about the inevitability of imperial overstretch, view these cases as proof of the U.S. 
decline (Monteiro, 2011: 10-11). But overall, the numbers of strength regarding economic 
power is to some point as favourable to the United States as military power. For the U.S. both 
GDP and GDP per capita are far higher than for both China and Russia. China has an 
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enormous population, but not much more territory than the United States. Russia with the 
largest territory has the most natural resources, especially oil and gas, but the U.S. has a much 
more diversified economy.  
Table 2. Showing the relative economic situation in 2012 (IMF, 2013) 
 USA China Russia 
GDP $US b. 15,653 366 8,250 241 1,953 555 
Population m. 314,311 1 353,821 141,924 
Size of territory km.² 9 629 091 9 706 961 17 098 242 
 
 
A Lasting Unipolar Moment? – Arguments in the Literature 
Kennedy has shown how great powers of history have risen and later fallen over the course of 
time (Kennedy, 1987b). The question today is, will the United States follow the same destiny 
as the British Empire, or will the hegemon prevail? Simply put, we can divide the arguments 
of continued U.S. supremacy into two categories. The first line of arguments state that the 
U.S. cannot be balanced because of its overpowering military strength and economic 
capabilities. Nor would any states attempt to balance, because the U.S. is not threatening 
them. The second group of arguments is based on notion of the U.S. as a benevolent hegemon 
(Kagan, 1998). Because the United States is a liberal democracy, researchers argue that other 
states can trust their intentions, and for many states the situation of U.S. hegemony is 
beneficial and therefore desired (Ikenberry, 2002; Lieber & Alexander, 2005).  
 
The argument that unipolarity invalidates the balancing responses of the international system 
described by Waltz, by transforming the very nature of it, is by Layne described as the most 
robust for long-lasting U.S. hegemony (Layne, 2006b: 14).  The argument is, among others, 
supported by Wohlforth who emphasises how, in a unipolar world, the concentration of power 
in the presence of the hegemon makes any effort to counterbalance it highly costly; too costly 
(Wohlforth, 1999). Some researchers, often called U.S. primacists, uphold that this 
concentration of power is currently present and that the military, economic and technological 
power of the United States creates a threshold that disheartens the possible challengers from 
even attempting starting the competition. For the last 60 years, the United States has invested 
in and built robust international financial institutions, they have managed to maintain NATO 
as a potent military alliance and have a role as a major player in almost any multinational 
debate around the world. Because of the enormous investments and achievements made 
through the years, the outputs, both economic and military, are still unprecedented compared 
to any other state. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were hugely costly, but the fact is that 
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their combined expenditures did not exceed one per cent of U.S. GDP, while the Vietnam 
War accounted for 1.6 per cent (Ahmadov, 2012: 2). In an international system prone to 
balancing and counterbalancing between single powers and alliances, the game often circles 
around states that are powerful enough to act as magnets and protective shields for those that 
would challenge the hegemon. One argument is that no such powerful state exists today.  
With the absence of a ‘coalition magnet’, it is very difficult to assemble a coalition of states 
with the necessary amount of hard power to fruitfully challenge the U.S. “States that might 
otherwise be tempted to balance against it are vulnerable to being singled out as potential 
rivals, and being punished by the hard fist of U.S. power” (Layne, 2006b: 15) . Zakaria 
acknowledges that the European Union is now the largest trade block in the world, and that 
China and other giants have the theoretical possibility to create bipolarity or even 
multipolarity, but this is an outcome he brushes aside. “In every realm except military, similar 
shifts are under way. In general, however, the notion of a multipolar world, with four or five 
players of roughly equal weight, does not describe reality today or in the near future” 
(Zakaria, 2008: 43).  
 
In recent years there has been an increasing focus from researchers, policy makers and 
reporters of the rising China and its alleged threat to the primacy of the United States. The 
emphasis on China has taken some focus off the traditional “foe” of the United States. But 
Russia is still important in the debates of U.S. primacy. However, in terms of economic 
growth China would have to spend at least two decades to catch up with the economic level of 
the U.S., even if China manages to continue its current record-high annual growth rate. 
(Ahmadov, 2012: 3; Overholt, 2012). The same can be said about military capabilities. Even 
if China is increasing its defense budget annually and continues its procurement of advanced 
weapons in vast quantities, the United States’ head start will secure the lead for at least 20 
years. Since the rise of China first and foremost is a story of economic growth, it is also 
interesting, according to U.S. primacists, to hear scholars like Nye, who questions whether 
economic power so easily can be translated into military power. Nye remind us that “the 
United States was the world’s largest economy for 70 years before it became a military 
superpower” (Nye, 2011).  
 
The second set of arguments claiming that unipolarity will likely last is represented by the 
balance of threat theory. Walt explains how most states have no motivation to balance against 
the U.S. because they do not see themselves as military threatened by the U.S (Walt, 1987). 
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Paul goes deeper and explains what about the U.S. hegemony it is that discourages 
counterbalancing from other states (Paul, 2005). The main reason, he finds, is that the United 
States is in fact protecting the territorial status quo of the globe. In spite of its status as a 
hegemon, the U.S. does not need to conquer other states’ territory to bolster its military or 
economic powers. Also, the second-strike nuclear capability that most of the second-tier states 
possess is a game-changer in the case of territorial conquest, and limits the behaviour of the 
imperial power. As we see, it is not only difficult to compete against the U.S. primacy, but 
there are also several factors that discourage states from engaging in counterbalancing, and 
instead encourage them to support the U.S. primacy. Many states view the U.S. leadership as 
a strategic necessity. “Even though regional powers emerge in different continents, the United 
States will be holding its primacy since regional powers still lack a capacity to play this role 
and thereby will want the U.S. presence” (Ahmadov, 2012). As the then U.S. senator Barack 
Obama wrote in an article published in Foreign Affairs in 2007, “America cannot meet the 
threats of this century alone, and the world cannot meet them without America” (Obama, 
2007: 4). In today’s world the reality is, the argument goes, that the interests of most states are 
compatible. If a challenging state emerges, it is more likely to be perceived as a threat to all, 
than a possible ally of some against the hegemony of the United States. It is maybe telling that 
the latest National Security Strategy document signed by President Obama in 2010 does not 
mention rising powers or counterbalancing at all (Obama, 2010). Even after massive cuts in 
defense spending, the United States is still the dominating military-political power in the 
world. At the same time, nuclear weapons can make it suicidal for a rising power to military 
challenge its peers. “Today’s Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join” 
(Ikenberry, 2008: 24). A true rival to Washington has yet to present itself, but the U.S. still 
faces a growing number of constraints. Although the world system seems stable it is important 
to remember that polarity is not a binary condition. “The world will not stay unipolar for 
decades and then, one day, suddenly switch and become bipolar or multipolar” (Zakaria, 
2008: 218). It is more likely to be a slow shift.  
 
Rising Powers as Balancers 
In the past many states have believed in their own benign motives and pursued seemingly 
peaceful ascents, but have still ended up upsetting the system. Gilpin notes that as a state’s 
power increases, “it will be tempted to try to increase its control of its environment. In order 
to increase its own security, it will try to expand its political, economic, and territorial control, 
it will try to change the international system in accordance with its particular set of interests” 
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(Gilpin, 1981: 94-95). We will let Zakaria explain further, “The crucial point here is that, 
throughout history, great powers have seen themselves as having the best intentions but being 
forced by necessity to act to protect their ever expanding interests. And as the world’s number 
two country, China will expand its interests substantially” (Zakaria, 2008: 115). The second-
tier states are responding to the U.S. hegemony (Hurrell, 2006).  
 
An Eroding Unipolar Moment? – Arguments in the Literature 
“When a state stands alone at the pinnacle of power, there is nowhere to go but down” (Walt, 
2011: 1). Over the years several scholars have warned that the United States as a hegemon 
would suffer from some sort of “imperial overstretch”. Although the term originated from 
Kennedy (Kennedy, 1987a), it has since been elaborated by, among others, Snyder (Snyder, 
2003), Layne (Layne, 2006a) and Ash (Ash, 2005). The imperial overstretch, they say, will 
ultimately force the United States down from the throne of hegemony. But first an argument 
of threats.  
 
Measuring capabilities or power is usually far easier than asserting intentions or threats. As 
we have seen, U.S. primacists argue that second-tier states, like the rest, do not balance 
against the U.S. because they do not feel threatened by the intentions of the hegemon. Rhodes, 
on the other hand, calls the balance of threat theory "wildly misleading" when it is used to 
argue for a lasting of U.S. hegemony (Rhodes, 2004: 150). Walt also recognizes the constant 
threat posed by the most powerful state to the other states in the system. "In a world of 
independent states, the strongest one is always a potential threat to the rest, if only because 
they cannot be entirely sure what it is going to do with the power at its command" (Walt, 
2005: 61). The unipolar world system consequently removes any fruitful distinction between 
balancing against power and balancing against intentions or threats, because the real threat is 
the overwhelming power concentrated at the hegemon’s service. “The consequences of 
guessing wrong about a hegemon's intentions are likely to be far worse in a unipolar system 
than in a multipolar system” (Layne, 2006b: 21). Walt maintains that the United States may 
assure other states that it poses no threat and wishes no harm if it “acts wisely” (Walt, 2005: 
61), but this ability is severely limited by the fact that in a unipolar world the other states must 
concern themselves primarily with the hegemon’s power rather than its intentions: the 
problem is that the capabilities of the U.S. are so great that no one can really be reassured.  
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Although the U.S. primacists claim that the United States is a nonthreatening hegemon 
because its powers are located behind great distances of ocean and therefore not inclined to be 
used to conquer “living space”, many states may see it differently. They view the presence of 
U.S. military troops and assets in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, both offshore and 
onshore as a potential threat indeed (Beeson, 2004; Carranza, 2010). With carrier fleets 
patrolling off their coasts and huge forces lurking over the horizon, China, Russia and the like 
should feel insecure. In a unipolar world, the burden of proof is on the hegemon to reassure to 
others that its power is not threatening (Layne, 2006b: 20-22). Dividing the world into two 
fronts and preaching, “You are either with us or against us”, is perhaps not the wisest thing to 
do to convince the rest of your good intentions. After the 9/11- attacks in 2001 the United 
States enjoyed a high level of sympathy from around the world, but the rhetoric and politics of 
the following years, with the invasion of Iraq as the low point, became the basis for a period 
of “remarkable apprehension on the United States even among the public of traditional NATO 
allies” (Ahmadov, 2012: 2).  
 
Secondly, there is also the case of arguing that the United States in fact does not possess the 
amount of power capabilities needed for fully discouraging other states to balance against 
them in any form (Cox, 2002). After all, if the U.S. is as almighty as the U.S. primacists 
argue, why has North Korea been allowed to develop a nuclear program? Pyongyang’s 
nuclear program may not yet yield a capacity to strike the U.S. mainland, but a nuclear bomb 
is still a nuclear bomb and the Seoul capital-area with 25 million inhabitants is just 40 
kilometres from the North Korean border – and several U.S. bases are in the vicinity. And 
why is the U.S. not taking any active steps to counter Chinese acquisitions of advanced 
weapons that will ultimately threaten their ability to protect Taiwan? Why is the U.S. letting 
India have the capability to cruise the worlds blue waters with a Russian-brought nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier (of course, India is a friend, but for how long)? One possible answer 
to these questions may be; “because they cannot do anything about it!” 
 
The Iraq war raised many questions regarding the United States ability to actually manage the 
world as a sole hegemon. The fact that it came to an invasion, against much protests from 
major states and even major U.S. allies, can be an argument that show the hegemon is alive 
and well, but the failure of the Iraq war and the strains it placed on the U.S. is on the contrary, 
an argument for a weary titan. The so-called “war on terror” had a number of flaws, and many 
researchers argue the Afghanistan and Iraq war were too costly economically and politically, 
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and of little use. Even worse, the hardship suffered in Afghanistan and Iraq can work against 
U.S. intentions and increase the relative power and assertiveness of Iran and other recalcitrant 
states, because these wars concentrate U.S. attention and tie up its forces, and they align anti-
U.S. forces. For Al Qaida, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a goldmine (Ahmadov, 2012). 
President George W. Bush outlined a “freedom agenda” and stated in his second inaugural 
speech that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic 
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending 
tyranny in our world” (Bush, 2005). The problem with a “freedom agenda” as a general 
foreign policy for a hegemon is that democracy promotion is often conflicted with other 
important foreign policy goals. Sometimes the cooperation to counter terrorism outweighs 
regimes’ autocratic nature and the oppression of democratic movements. Democracy, on the 
other hand can produce governments that are hostile to U.S. interests. As Huntington 
observed as early as in 1996, “Democracy is promoted, but not if it brings Islamic 
fundamentalists to power” (Huntington, 1996: 41). More importantly, great powers like China 
and Russia see U.S. “democracy-spreading” as threatening to their own regimes. It is also 
noted around the world that nonproliferation is a fundamental concern in the cases of Iraq and 
Iran, while it is not mentioned in the case of Israel. Ahmadov questions if the United States 
have too much confidence in its own ability to gather the other states in a united effort 
towards common interests, while it really shows unilateral strategies and ignorance of global 
support. Huntington reminds us that “What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the 
rest” (Huntington, 1996: 40).  
 
Remember, the question is not whether the United States is to collapse as did the Soviet 
Union, but rather whether if the U.S. will endure as the hegemon in a unipolar world system. 
Walt is talking about the end of the “unipolar moment” – and expects the world will see either 
“a bipolar Sino-American rivalry or a multipolar system containing several unequal great 
powers” (Walt, 2011: 4). A United States that fail to realize its own weakening position does 
not escape the truth simply by ignoring it. As Kennedy showed in this book of The Rise and 
Fall of British Naval Mastery, politicians and bureaucrats often find it difficult to change their 
foreign policy expectations according to the falling economic capabilities (Kennedy, 1976).  It 
is maybe telling that, although the financial crisis hit in 2008, it took the U.S. Department of 
Defense five years until 2012 to conclude in its 21
st
 priority paper for sustaining global 
leadership that it was important to evaluate “the U.S. defense strategy in light of the changing 
geopolitical environment and changing fiscal circumstances” (Department of Defense, 2012: 
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1). With the major cuts in the defence budget implemented by president Obama (a cut from 
$600 bn. to $486 bn. and the sequester’s $55 billion-a-year defence cuts do not end until 
2021), it is already clear that the economic recession is limiting the capabilities of Washington 
(The Economist, 2013b). The real change in the condition for U.S. hegemony has little to do 
with the United States itself. “In the 1990s, Russia was completely dependent on American 
aid and loans. Now it posts annual budget surpluses in the tens of billions of dollars. Then, the 
East Asian nations desperately needed the IMF to bail them out of their crisis. Now they have 
massive foreign exchange reserves” (Zakaria, 2008: 217).  
 
Hard Power and Balance of Power Theory 
“When the leading states in the international system use their resources to pursue security 
objectives, what stands in their way? Realism highlights one answer: other major powers” 
(Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008: 22).  
 
Balancing is basically a strategy of counterweight. It is a minor state’s answer to a system 
where power is over-concentrated in one state or one group of states. Balancing occurs when 
power is distributed asymmetrically, and the weaker states are at risk of being dominated by 
the stronger ones. Traditionally balancing has been understood as the use of hard military 
power to counter existential threats (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979). Hard balancing is 
therefore about using military force to respond to the military powers of other states. Pape 
sums up hard balancing against the United States as “military build-ups, war-fighting 
alliances, and transfers of military technology to U.S. opponents” (Pape, 2005: 9). In 
balancing theory it is always expected that power will check power, and the answer to 
military power is military power. To what extent the other states have to engage in the 
activities described by Pape in order to be qualified as hard balancers is debated among 
scholars (Wagner, 2010). The Cold War made the designation easy, but the world today is 
more complex. This thesis analyses the second-tier states’ arms trade, and is therefore 
focusing on the “transfers of military technology to U.S. opponents”, as described by Pape.  
 
Traditionally understood, balancing can take the form of internal balancing with military 
build-up, or external balancing with the participation in military alliances. Of course it is 
possible, and indeed quite common, for states to do both, as was the case for most Western 
European states under The Cold War. As Jervis writes, “power is checked most effectively by 
counterbalancing power” (Jervis, 2003: 84). The former U.S. president Woodrow Wilson 
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stated that he disliked the balance of power because he believed it caused wars. The defenders 
of the balance-of-power policies argue of course that it creates stability. However, history has 
shown us that peace and stability is not the same thing. This is true because states balance 
power not to preserve peace but to preserve their own independence (Nye & Welch, 2011: 
75). Balance of power has several meanings, but for this thesis we are considering balance of 
power as a policy. In this aspect balance of power predicts that states will act to prevent any 
one state from developing a preponderance of power. This is an old and well established 
policy in international relations. The British foreign minister in 1914, Sir Edward Grey, did 
not want to go to war, but eventually did – because he feared Germany would gain 
preponderance in Europe by controlling the Continent (Nye & Welch, 2011: 76). In this 
respect, the balance-of-power theory predicts that other states, alone or in concert, will try to 
bring the U.S.-power hegemony into balance (Waltz, 1993: 53).  
 
There are different views and understandings of the U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world. One 
of these is to see the hegemony of the United States as so powerful and imposing that it is the 
natural duty of every state to try and resist it. The infamous late French president François 
Mitterrand once stated, “France does not know it, but we are at war with America. Yes, a 
permanent war, a vital war, a war without death. Yes, they are very hard, the Americans, they 
are voracious, they want undivided power over the world” (Mead, 2002: 33). The biggest 
challenge for leaders and policymakers trying to assess the balance of power is measuring 
changes in power resources and how to balance against them and survive (Nye & Welch, 
2011: 75). 
 
Soft Power and Balancing 
Researchers like Brooks, Wohlforth and Zakaria believe that traditional counterbalancing is 
too costly under unipolarity. However, states still have the opportunity to wield power against 
the hegemon. The type of power they talk about “operate at a lower, less comprehensive level 
than the typical conception of balancing” (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008: 60). Pape defines soft 
balancing as “actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use 
nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military 
policies” (Pape, 2005: 10). But soft balancing can include actions of “territorial denial, 
entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening and signaling of resolve to participate in a 
balancing coalition” (Pape, 2005: 9-10). Soft balancing clearly differs from traditional hard 
balancing, but its function and result are similar (Nye, 1990). In his article “Soft balancing in 
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the Age of U.S. Primacy”, Paul agrees with Brooks and Wohlforth that since the end of the 
Cold War, the second-tier major powers have generally abandoned traditional hard balancing 
which relied on counterbalancing military alliances and arms build-ups.  
 
This does not mean that the second-tier powers are just watching the manifestation of the U.S. 
hegemony with ease. They are not at ease argue Paul, but because the second-tier states do not 
believe that their sovereignty or security are directly threatened by the hegemon, the response 
is not hard balancing. Without this existential fear the actors can allow other motivations and 
strategies to work (Nye, 2009). With the exclusion of United Kingdom, all the major powers 
are still taking steps to at least slow and hinder the hegemonic power the United States 
possess in the current world system (Paul, 2005: 47). In this new environment of international 
relations the response from the other major powers to the U.S. actions includes 
bandwagoning, buck-passing and free-riding (when states follow, ignore or benefit without 
contributing). The intention behind these responses is to both constrain U.S. power and to 
maintain their own security. Paul shows how the second-tier states engage in soft balancing, 
with a strategy that “involves the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, 
especially at the United Nations, with the implicit threat of upgrading their alliances if the 
United States goes beyond its stated goals” (Paul, 2005: 74). Walt (2011) supports Pape’s 
argument that the strategy of aggressive unilateralism applied by President George W. Bush 
has damaged the United States’ good reputation of benign intent and respect for other major 
powers. With U.S. unilateral action and unforgiving language in their mind, major powers 
have reconsidered their assessment of the potential threat the hegemon poses to them. As a 
result, “major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behaviour against 
the United States” (Pape, 2005: 9). “[…] if the United States acts in ways that fuel global 
concerns about U.S. power and undermine its long standing reputation for begin intent, efforts 
to balance the United States will increase and the United States will find itself increasingly 
isolated” (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008: 61-62). Soft balancing strategies can include vetoing 
UN resolution, sanctioning or taxing trade, postponing or breaking diplomatic relations, 
denying use of territory, harbours or airspace, or in other ways (peacefully) undermining 
policy efforts of the hegemon. Pape contends that original responses of soft balancing towards 
actions that change their perception of threat posed by other states, can “evolve into hard 
balancing” (Pape, 2005: 18). Understanding soft balancing is therefore important even if you 
do not believe soft power can balance.  
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To sum up, there is no doubt that unpopular U.S. policies have affected the decision-making 
and public opinion of foreign governments in ways that hurt or hinder U.S strategy. These 
counteractions from the other states impede both U.S. foreign policy and military security. 
There is, however, a discussion about whether or not they should be called “soft balancing” 
because this implies that they are the outgrowth of balancing dynamics. If soft balancing is 
indeed a form of balancing that is the product of direct concerns about U.S. power and 
intentions, “then the United States faces the prospect of more, and more intense, efforts to 
constrain its power in response to its security policy” (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008: 62). When 
examining policy and actions made by second-tier states, it is always important to remember 
that even if those actions have negative effects on the U.S., these actions were not necessarily 
produced with that intent only. States seek economic growth, local security and other 
objectives that may unintentionally harm the United States. This shows how difficult it can be 
to interpret arms transfers – that is, to determine if they are acts of deliberate balancing 
against the U.S. or merely cases of regular trade with unintended effects.  
 
The Second-Tier States – Power, Goals, and Behaviour 
The second-tier states are the major powers (China, Russia, United Kingdom, France and 
Germany) that are closest to the United States in power and therefore best placed to balance 
against it. Since the U.K. often emphasises its “special relationship” with the U.S., they are 
not likely to engage in balancing behaviour. While the U.K. supported the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq, Germany and France strongly opposed it, so much so that they were accused of soft 
balancing. However, both being Western democratic states with strong current and historic 
ties with the United States, as well as NATO- members, they are not in a position conducive 
to the use of arms trade as a balancing tool. A quick search through the SIPRI Arms Transfers 
Database by and large confirms this. We are then left with China and Russia, two states that 
both repeatedly state their goal of a multipolar system and protest against U.S. foreign policy. 
Of the second-tier states, China and Russia also differ the most politically from the United 
States.  
 
“From the early 1990s, the deepening of bilateral ties between Russia and China has been 
predicated to a considerable extent on the desire to balance against the dominant power of the 
United States” (Mankoff, 2012: 202). For Russia, China appears as a very attractive partner 
for strategic cooperation on many levels. Besides the obvious power and capabilities that lies 
in the growing Chinese nation, Moscow understands that Beijing shares their view on the 
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international system today, and how it should be in the future. Both Russia and China are 
strongly uneasy about the current international system where the world is dominated by the 
United States, and western norms including democracy and all-inclusive human rights are set 
to be the standard. Neither Russia nor China is happy about western values working as 
international laws interfering in their internal affairs. According to statements by the Russian 
Foreign Ministry, it is “Russia’s long-term national interests and the similarity of approaches 
to the fundamental questions of international politics”, that explains the well-developed 
Russo-Chinese cooperation (Mankoff, 2012: 182). In their official foreign policy documents, 
the Russian word for multipolarity – “mnogopolyarnost” – is central in the description of the 
evolving new world order. The Chinese authorities have an equivalent word, – “duojihua” – 
which  they use in the same way as the Russian equivalent to describe the multipolar division 
of power in the near future international system. Nearly all form of cooperation between 
Moscow and Beijing can be understood in the light of the joint Russo-Chinese belief that a 
world system where the majority of power is divided between a handful of Great Powers, and 
where state sovereignty and national interests are respected, is the best system to serve their 
own well-being. The cooperation enhances both Russia’s and China’s ability to challenge  the 
legitimacy of the U.S. hegemony (Mankoff, 2012: 182-183).  
 
Russia’s seemingly sporadic attempt to parallel and counterbalance NATO with its own 
security alliance, called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SOC), is often lost on policy 
makers discussing second-tier states balancing against the U.S. hegemony. One reason can of 
course be that the as the driving force behind the security organization, Russia seems yet to 
have incorporated the SOC in its Grand Strategy. In addition to Russia, the organisation 
consists of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. For some time the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization was seen as a possible replacement for the Soviet era 
Warsaw Pact, with the potential capability and intention to balance and check the expansion 
of the United States’ global influence. However, the SOC has not developed to its full 
thought-of potential, but the initiative behind it and the cooperation the organisation enables is 
quite interesting, and should be noted. The idea of the SOC can easily be seen as a move of 
hard balancing against the United States. Beijing and especially Moscow, are actively 
supplying the member states with advanced weapon systems in an order that could easily 
qualify as hard balancing (Pape, 2005; Waltz, 1979). Russia and China are also partners in the 
interesting but still rather loosely coordinated BRICS organisation. Together with the other 
members – India, Brazil and South Africa – China and Russia are using the group to improve 
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cooperation and follow common strategies as rising powers. The first formal meeting at 
minister level were held in Russia (President of Russia, 2009). Important international 
organisations where the U.S. is not a member are few and far between, but BRICS is one, and 
is one notable exception, and this is not a coincidence.  
 
The driving force behind the extended strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has 
often been situations were Washington reminded the others of its premier power-projection 
capability and dominance in world politics. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was 
established in 2001 on the pattern of its predecessor The Shanghai Five, but with a larger 
member group and a greater emphasis on security cooperation. The new organisation could 
thus be a more potent counterbalancing force against the U.S. involvement in the region. As 
early as in 1997, Russia and China made a joint declaration on the formation of a multipolar 
world. This was above all a warning to the United States that China and Russia no longer 
would accept an international order dominated by Washington alone. Rhetoric aside, to reach 
their goal of a multipolar world, of course, means that either the U.S. must downscale its 
powers, or the others must successfully balance against it. There is a clear linkage between 
China’s interest in buying advanced weaponry from Russia, Russia’s willingness to sell such 
weaponry despite its own concerns about China’s future intentions, and how Moscow and 
Beijing view U.S. power (Mankoff, 2012: 202). If not for how the 9/11 attacks congregated 
most of the world’s states into cooperation in fighting terrorism as a common enemy, the role 
of the new Russo-Chinese security organization would probably have been given more 
attention in Washington.  
 
“The importance of China’s relations with every other country in the world is dwarfed by its 
relation with one – the United States of America” (Zakaria, 2008: 123). U.S. involvement 
trumps all other dimensions of policy. For example, a war between China and Taiwan will be 
bloody and tragic, but with U.S. involvement it will have far greater consequences. It is the 
same for Russia. Their foreign policy strategy is to a great extent shaped by U.S. actions and 
reaction. The 2008 Russo-Georgian war, for example, is commonly thought to be related with 
Georgia’s policy to link with the West, including NATO. Holmes and Yoshihara investigated 
the military strategy for the future Chinese naval forces and concluded that they to a large 
extent followed the strategic thinking of 19
th
-century naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan 
(Mahan, [1890] 1987), focusing on control of the commons. According to Holmes and 
Yoshihara, “Chinese discussions of the commons appear ambitious and even warlike” 
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(Holmes & Yoshihara, 2006: 177). Interestingly, they also show how many of China’s 
foremost journals on international relations and military security write about how China must 
embrace ideas like those of Mahan and arm up to challenge the United States in the waters of 
South-East Asia.  One Chinese scholar, for example, used Mahan to justify China’s need for 
taking control of strategic passages and important sea-lanes that goods and materials have to 
traverse. He saw the command of communications on the sea vital to the future of China, and 
concluded, “Dominant naval power, then, was the crucial determinant of national prosperity 
and greatness” (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2006: 177). The empirical analysis will investigate if 
there is any relation between the apparent new security strategy of Beijing and the arms 
transferred by Russia.  
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Chapter 3: The Arms Trade of Second-Tier 
States – Balancing (f)or Profit? 
To maintain their relative position in the system, states must balance against stronger states by 
improving their own relative capabilities. They will try to improve their relative capabilities 
either by internal means through rearmament, or by external means which include the 
establishment of military alliances (Waltz, 2000). Arms trading is of course a source of state 
revenues, and, consequently, of their relative economic power as well, but arms trading is 
likely to have an even more pronounced effect as a form of hard or soft balancing. We can 
look at weapon transfers as one of many possible strategies for balancing. Depending on the 
situation, arms exports can function as hard or soft balancing. Pape sums up hard balancing 
against the United States as “military build-ups, war-fighting alliances, and transfers of 
military technology to U.S. opponents” (Pape, 2005: 9). Soft balancing, on the other hand, can 
include actions of “territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening and 
signalling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition” (Pape, 2005: 9-10). It is not hard 
to imagine that arms trade can fit into both categories. This thesis analyses the arms trade of 
the second-tier states for balancing behaviour against the hegemon. Since neither Russia nor 
China is in open conflict with the United States, Waltz’s traditional understanding of 
counterbalancing may not fully explain their actions. With that in mind, we make use of a 
broad perspective, including theories of soft balancing, when analysing the arms trade of 
Russia and China. I argue that the arms trade of the second-tier states does indeed function as 
a form of balancing strategy.  
 
The role of the arms trade in counterbalancing is controversial, and although there has not yet 
been concluded much research explicitly on how the arms trade is used to balance against the 
U.S., there does exist research concluding that it does not play a significant part. For example, 
Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the balance-of-threat theory fails to explain the Russo-
Chinese arms trade. They use a form of counterfactual analysis and say the Chinese arms 
procurement is only interesting to other scholars because the arms come from Russia. If China 
had bought similar amounts and types of weapons from Israel or South Africa instead, they 
argue the arms transfers would not have been given so much attention (Brooks & Wohlforth, 
2008: 77). But I do think that Brooks and Wohlforth miss a vital point, namely, that what 
kinds of weapon systems that are sold is more important than just the sheer numbers of them. 
Because some weapons are capabilities in their own, their numbers are not the most important 
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factor. Who is selling China the most arms is not interesting if it is just field cannons they are 
selling. On the other hand, who is selling China advanced combat aircraft and anti-ship 
missiles is quite an interesting issue. The case of the Russo-Chinese arms trade is no doubt 
intriguing because Russia is both the far largest supplier and sells the most advanced 
potentially game-changing weapon systems to China. On top of this is the fact that in 2000, 
the Russian President by decree established a federal agency for managing and controlling all 
arms exports of the federation. Rosoboronexport is the federal state unitary enterprise 
effectively controlling all exports of Russian-produced arms. Rosoboronexport “is more than 
a seller of weapons; rather, it has become an industrial behemoth that is monopolizing whole 
sectors of this industry on behalf of the state” (Blank, 2007: V).  
 
The continued transferring of arms is important because just having access to components and 
technology will not be enough for other states, by themselves, to produce and field weapons 
that are capable to rivalling those of the U.S. “To produce capable weapons systems, 
components and technology must be married with sufficient production experience, design 
skills, and general knowledge of systems integration” (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008: 135). By 
allowing other states to obtain new military technologies that can challenge the U.S. military 
force and thus reduce the magnitude of U.S. hard power, second-tier states can use the arms 
trade to balance the hegemon. Shifts in capabilities that constrain U.S. security policy can be 
described as balancing. This shift in capabilities can be the result of states purchasing weapon 
systems that rival those of the United States (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008: 133). Of course, 
weapons can be constructed indigenously, but purchasing weapons is time-saving because the 
whole research and development stage is thereby skipped and replaced with ready products 
and the possibility of technology transfer and reengineering. Also, for some states, because of 
poor relations with the U.S., it is very difficult to develop the most advanced weapon systems 
themselves. For example, Iranian students are consistently expelled from any Western 
university course concerning space technology, nuclear power and rocket science. The 
practice is supported by a UN resolution urging member states to hinder Iran from developing 
their nuclear program (Carlsen, Døvik, & Sunnanå, 2009). Because of embargoes, the 
recipient state has to have good connections in order to get deals tied up. The supplier state 
has to weigh the benefits of the transfers against the negative aspects of dealing with states 
that are under embargo from other states. “Because of the great concentration of the global 
arms market in the hands of the United States and its NATO allies, whenever the European 
powers and the United States simultaneously restrict arms sales, it will be very difficult to 
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import arms that are capable of rivalling U.S. forces” (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008: 134). 
There is, of course, one major supplier that countries can turn to when it becomes difficult to 
acquire arms elsewhere, and that is Russia. The data from the arms trade database from SIPRI 
show that states like Iran, Syria, Venezuela and China – all of whom are at bad terms with the 
U.S. and much of the Western world in general – have over time been able to buy large 
quantities of weapons from Russia (SIPRI, 2013a).  
 
Arms Trade for Profit 
Since most of the current literature concerning the possible second-tier states balancing 
against the United States fail to mention the arms trade, diminishes its importance, or 
maintain that the arms trade is only for profit, I will investigate how important the aspect of 
profit is for the arms trade. There are considerable sums involved and shifting hands in the 
global arms trade every year. It is therefore possible that the sole motivation for the second-
tier states to sell arms is to gain profits. The volume and value of the total arms trade have 
varied much over the years. With a low point in the mid-nineties, the total world expenditure 
is higher from 2008 to today than it was in the late 1980’s when SIPRI started gathering data. 
From SIPRI’s database of the total world arms trade we can in general deduce two interesting 
facts. The first is that the global arms trade experienced a dramatic fall following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War. The second is that the total expenditures 
of the global arms trade have been climbing fast since the nineties, and has exceeded the 
numbers for the last years of the Cold War (SIPRI, 2013b). In the analysis we will look closer 
to the revenues of China’s and Russia’s arms trade.  
 
Arms Trade as Hard Balancing – My Enemy’s Enemy is My 
Friend 
Traditionally arms transfers are categorized as a form of hard balancing when the arms go 
directly to other states or groups that share your opposition to others (Pape, 2005: 10). The 
weapons transferred from the United States to Western Europe under the Marshall plan in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, is to be considered hard balancing against the Soviet Union. 
Likewise, Soviet arms transferred to North Vietnam later in the Cold War were definitely seen 
as hard balancing against the United States. In these cases it is clear that states use the arms 
trade as a realist foreign policy tool. The transactions are rightly considered acts of hard 
balancing, and thus placed in the same category as strategic alliances between states. 
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For second-tier powers and other states that are set on defending contested zones against the 
United States, several advantages accrue. The competitive effectiveness of the enemy forces 
positively correlates with the proximity of the U.S. forces to their territory. “This arises from 
a combination of political, physical, and technological facts. These facts combine to create a 
contested zone—arenas of conventional combat where weak adversaries have a good chance 
of doing real damage to U.S. forces” (Posen, 2003: 22). On a general basis, Posen argues that 
the defender enjoys a perception of higher political stakes, more manpower in-theatre, and 
better knowledge of the local situation that gives them an advantage in using less advanced 
but still effective weapons on their own turf. “Under such favorable conditions, even third-
rate military powers such as Somalia have imposed unacceptable political costs on the U.S. 
military” (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2006: 183). Why is this important? Because a rising and 
more capable China can create contested zones in strategic areas proximate their own coast. 
The East Asian commons are exposed to a China with heightened military capabilities. This is 
of course no secret, and Russia, which has a long history of thinking in terms of geopolitics 
(Mankoff, 2012), understands the opportunities  that China has to contest the U.S. hegemony 
in the region. The ongoing modernization of the Chinese military has witnessed considerable 
resources being devoted to weapon systems that seem to address the U.S. military capabilities 
in South East Asia, including anti-access/aria denial weapons in the form of submarines, anti-
ship missiles, and surface-to-air systems. Most of these weapons systems, and the technology 
for developing them, have been transferred from Russia, and are a great concern of the United 
States (Department of Defense, 2012). 
 
The arms trade is an important x-factor in China’s strive for military buildup. Russia is 
effectively boosting China’s ability to challenge the United States in East Asia. In ongoing 
civil war in Syria, only two states have so far sold weapons to the Assad regime – Iran and 
Russia. Even against massive international pressure, a loss of standing and with limited 
prospect of revenues, Russia sold advanced anti-air systems that could severely complicate a 
later international intervention like the one in Libya.  
 
Arms Trade as Soft Balancing 
If we think that major powers use arms transfers as a foreign policy tool (because they can!), 
but when looking at the current world map we observe no clear hostilities between the major 
powers, soft balancing can explain how arms transfers can nevertheless be used as a balancing 
tool. Like bandwagoning, buck-passing and other strategies that hinder and strain the 
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hegemon, arms transfers to the opposition in areas of interest to the U.S. can look innocent but 
still function as (soft) balancing. Soft balancing may be the foundation for more hearty forms 
of balancing behaviour. It appears that pariah states with poor relations with the United States 
are finding relations with Russia and China to be a rational option for balancing against the 
U.S. hegemony (Wagner, 2010: 27). The arms trade of second-tier states may be an effective 
tool in their strategy. As Bukkvoll explains,  
 
“Developing countries procure arms, including Russian arms, for many different purposes. 
One purpose might be to deter and withstand future military pressure from international 
coalitions that for different reasons might contemplate military action against these countries. 
This is of course especially the case for countries that have particularly strained political 
relations with one or more of the leading Western nations” (Bukkvoll, 2011: 31). 
 
In a more traditional understanding of soft balancing, arms trading can also be used as a 
foreign policy tool to gain political influence at the sacrifice of others. Arms trading can be 
used to push out other states that compete in establishing relationships with a specific state. 
An example of this kind of strategy may be found in Russia’s trade with India, as a 
counterbalancing effort against the United States’ increasing positioning there. Moscow is 
certainly making good money on the India- trade, but is it not also possible that states can 
follow two lines of thought at the same time? We will investigate Russia’s trade with India in 
the empirical analysis.     
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Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis 
Do second-tier states use arms exports in order to balance U.S. hegemony? Through 
systematic analysis of the arms trade of Russia and China, their costumers and the particular 
arms they are supplying, and accounting for the context of each case, we will answer the 
question.  
 
Methodological Engagement 
This part will explain which methods are used in the thesis and how the data are engaged in 
the analysis. Here the thesis’s operationalization will be laid out.  
 
Identifying Challenging States 
Which states are considered enemies of the United States, and which states would a second-
tier state be wise to support in order to better balance against the hegemon? Below follows a 
table showing countries that qualify as major buyers of weapon systems with strategic 
importance in the period 2000 to 2012. On the basis of the SIPRI Arms transfer database I 
have analysed every listed receiver of both Chinese and Russian arms, and sorted out the 
significant clients. By weapons of strategic importance I am referring to advanced weapons 
like long distance cruise missiles, surface-to-air batteries, anti-ship batteries, advanced combat 
aircraft, submarines, fire control radars, major warships, or other weapon systems (like anti-
access/area denial weapons) that few states produce and that can make real difference  on the 
modern battlefield. In the table I have sorted out the states that to various degree can be 
considered to follow foreign policy strategies that challenge the interests of the United States. 
If we start from the top, Both China, Syria, Iran and Venezuela are states that clearly have 
opposing grand strategies to that of the United States, and are often  identified as “enemies” 
(Hook & Spainer, 2012; Lindsay, 2011). They are in an exclusive group of states that get 
mentioned by name in U.S. security white papers on a regular basis, e.g. the DoD report of 
national security challenges (Department of Defense, 2012). It is important to emphasize that 
each state has to be treated individually to fully understand the nature of their relation with the 
United States, but for analytical purposes we can group them accordingly. Iran is different 
from China, but both are a challenge to the U.S. grand strategy of global leadership. Sudan 
can also be viewed as a challenge to the U.S., admittedly not in the same way as Iran, but the 
nature of that regime, the human rights violations, its military alliance with China and the 
overall geostrategic situation certainly make Sudan relevant (Campbell, 2007). Sudan fits the 
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profile of a terrorist-harbouring state, and some form of active UN intervention has long been 
planned (Tisdale, 2009). India, for its part, has relative good relations with Washington but, as 
we shall see later, the U.S. here finds itself in a competition with Russia, and Moscow is 
winning many of the battles, especially what the arms trade is concerned. India is therefore a 
possible challenge to the United States. The rest of the list of possible challengers consists of 
states that are in a military alliance with Russia or China and that could quite easily develop 
into real challenges in connection with their acquirement of advanced weaponry. Although 
Pakistan does buy large quantities of arms from both China and Russia, it has a formal 
alliance agreement with the U.S., and is therefore not a challenger.  
Table 3. Significant arms importers and their affiliation with the U.S. 
Country 
Name 
Has acquired weapon systems of 
strategic importance from Russia 
or China between 2000 and 2012 
Considered Challenging 
state by the United States  
China Yes Yes 
Syria Yes Yes 
Iran Yes Yes 
Venezuela Yes Yes 
Sudan Yes Yes 
Belarus Yes Possibly 
India Yes Possibly 
Myanmar Yes Possibly 
Algeria Yes Possibly 
Armenia Yes Possibly 
Azerbaijan Yes Possibly 
Indonesia Yes Possibly 
Viet Nam Yes Possibly 
Bangladesh Yes No 
Pakistan Yes No 
 
 
The Data 
In general there are three ways of studying the data of arms transfers, or rather three sources 
for data: each individual state’s official data, data from the US Congressional Research 
Service and the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. The research programme led by Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is today probably the best and the most used 
method for obtaining data for analysing and reporting on international arms trade (Midford & 
de Soysa, 2010). The SIPRI data are easy to comprehend and are made available for the 
public. Because only a fraction of the states dealing in arms release an official list of the 
financial value of the transactions, SIPRI has devised a method of estimating the value of 
transfers based on a comparison of similar types weapons and adjusting for the current 
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technological value, thereby creating a very useful form of measurement (Holtom, Bromley, 
& Simmel, 2012).  
 
The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is maintained by the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme 
and contains information on all international transfers of major conventional weapons to 
states, international organizations and non-state armed groups since 1950. The word 
“transfer” is used because the database includes sales, gifts, aid, and conveying technology. 
The phrase “major conventional weapons” means that the database contains information about 
all weapons or parts of weapons with the exception of nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons, and small arms (like pistols and rifles). The ABC weapons are excluded because of 
their nature as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and are subjects to other databases. Small 
arms or hand guns are very easy to produce and ship, and are therefore difficult to trace and 
run a global inventory of. It is also much easier to distinguish between military and civilian-
intended use when investigating transfers of tanks and guided missiles, as compared to 
shotguns. Importantly it is the major conventional weapons that can make the real difference 
on the battlefield and forster a change in the military balance between states and regions. The 
trade registers provide details of the supplying and recipient state, the type and number 
weapon system ordered and delivered, the year of the delivery, and when possible, the 
financial value of the transfer. Both deals that involve transfers of physical weapons and 
transfers of technology necessary for the production of such equipment by the buyer (licensed 
production) are included in the database (Bromley, Holtom, Perlo-Freeman, & Wezeman, 
2009). The information of arms transfers that SIPRI are collecting for maintaining the 
database can come from either national reports, government reports, press releases or media 
reports (Holtom, Bromley, & Simmel, 2012).  
 
Challenges of Using Arms Trade as an Indicator 
When the supplier state is not openly in active conflict with Washington, it is challenging to 
conclude if the arms trade is acts of balancing or just trade for profit. The trade registers 
cannot by themselves tell if states are balancing or not; we need accompanying information. 
Nor can the data distinguish between hard and soft balancing. Although SIPRI does a fantastic 
job collecting and presenting the data of the arms trade in their database, some states make the 
information-gathering very hard. This can lead to missing data and errors in calculations. 
Some specific arms transfers are more clouded by secrecy than others, and we can surely find 
evidence of transactions that are not reported. One prominent example is North Korea. An 
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exceptionally low number of arms transfers registered it as flowing to the despised 
dictatorship. In spite of sanctions placed upon Pyongyang, and as should be clear when 
watching pictures of North Korean military parades, it is obvious that they are trading with 
someone. The biggest suspects are China, Russia and Iran (Department of Defense, 2012; 
Kan, 2012).  Although this thesis discusses the general profits the arms trade produce, it does 
not focus on the value of single transactions. However, the thesis does make particular notes 
of the specific arms included in the transfers, what kind of weapon system and what models 
are supplied. There is, of course, room for errors in several stages in the research.  
 
Content Analysis 
In this thesis I use quantitative data of the global arms trade and content or textual analysis to 
analyse trends and the policies or strategies behind it. The thesis uses information from a great 
number of written sources ranging from 19
th
- century foreign policy proposals, to classic 
international politics theories, to current newspaper articles. I use content analysis both to find 
relevant sources of information, and to analyse these sources for words and meaning that can 
shed light on the questions this thesis raise. There are different levels of content analysis and 
different uses for them (Pierce, 2008: 263). While most research articles and newspaper 
reports are read with the intent of finding relevant information and opinions, white papers and 
government reports have been investigated closer, including searches for key words and 
phrases. Content analysis can therefore be very useful when analysing political or government 
papers (Neuendorf, 2002). Choosing this form of research method was based on its 
practicality for this research project and its several advantages as a research method in 
general. Content analysis is a good method for research that includes much text with little or 
no statistical data. It is a method well-suited for analysing text from different sources, it is 
simple but at the same time consequent, and with a natural distance to the subjects it is 
objective (Pierce, 2008: 264). When reading the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, I am 
looking for specific kinds of weapons transferred from one specific state to another. For this 
thesis, arms transfers from Russia to China and other states that pose current or potential 
challenges for the United States are looked upon with extra interest. I am also scanning the 
transfer database for weapon systems that are particularly important in the sense that they give 
the owner new capabilities. Especially intriguing are those capabilities that limit other states’ 
power-projecting or -striking abilities. Submarines are an example of a weapons system that 
has the ability to effectively hinder the movement of the forces of other states in a specific sea 
area. The classic power-projection weapon system of the last century is the aircraft carrier. To 
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counter an aircraft carrier, surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship missiles can be effective. 
Content analysis is a good method for isolating the interesting information.  
 
Content analysis can certainly be criticised on some accounts, such as with regards to 
problems with identifying the population of texts, and therefore, of obtaining a random 
representative sample of texts. Also, the selection of texts is vulnerable to the bias of the 
researcher (Pierce, 2008: 264). Content analysis demands operationalization that fits the 
intended area of application and research project in general. The researcher must always be 
prepared to adjust his methodological approach and most important, the results must be 
understood in its context (Manheim, Rich, Willnat, & Brians, 2008: 193). To overcome the 
weaknesses of the method, early on I employed flexible criteria for information gathering 
thereby allowing for later adjustments. I also paid great attention to the context when 
analysing data and sources.  
 
Analysis 
In the following analysis I will, on the basis of arms-trade data, investigate if the second-tier 
states (Russia and China) use arms transfers to balance (hard or soft) against the United 
States’ hegemony. I examine the profit argument of second-tier arms trade and look for 
changing patterns over the years. But first an overview of the global arms trade. 
The Global Arms Trade – Overall Patterns 
Among states it is widely acknowledged that there is a need for maintaining responsible arms 
export policies. Responsible is taken to mean the prevention of transfers of arms or other 
military equipment that could fuel on-going violent conflicts or promote instability and 
threaten the global security in general. States also agree upon the principles of effective export 
controls for arms that prevent exported weapons from finding their way into the hands of 
unauthorized users, in worst case terrorists, criminals or other armed groups (Bromley et al., 
2009: 1). But international relations and foreign policy derive from the basis of doing what is 
best for one’s own country, and sometimes policymakers believe that “my enemy’s enemy is 
my friend”. The record shows that it is obvious that some states still find rational reasons for 
the transfer of arms to states and regimes that cannot and should not be considered 
benevolent. 
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The all-time high for international arms trade was in 1982. At the time, the world was 
characterized by the Cold War’s suspicion, insecurity and fear of all-out war. There was an 
on-going arms race between the two opposing sides, and with the rest of the world forced to 
join the game. The end of the Cold War marked a clear decline in the global arms trade, and 
the decline of these weapons transfers continued until the lowest point was reached in 2002, 
when sales only amounted to 38 per cent of their Cold War high (SIPRI, 2013a, 2013b). 
SIPRI maintains that one of the clearest aspects of the global arms trade is the steady 
composition of both the list of the five biggest suppliers and, only with minor changes, 
recipient states. For the last years the five biggest suppliers have been the United States, 
Russia, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. They have accounted for 75 per cent of 
total arms exports (Holtom, Bromley, Wezeman, & Wezeman, 2012: 1).  
 
The Arab Spring and the Arms Trade 
During the 2011 uprisings the governments of Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Libya 
ordered and used already imported weapons to smother the many peaceful demonstrations as 
well as the more violent protests. There are clear documentations of imported weapons being 
used in a number of violations of international humanitarian law, and the civil conflicts have 
demanded tens of thousands of fatalities (Price, Klinger, & Ball, 2013),  and this has sparked 
debates in many of the weapons-exporting states as well as internationally (Holtom, Bromley, 
Wezeman, et al., 2012). The circumstances and politics behind these arms transfers are very 
much the subject of this analysis and will therefore be covered in more detail later on. If we 
only look at the numbers, one would be inclined to believe that the Assad regime in Syria 
knew what was coming. The total weapons imports of that Middle Eastern state increased by 
580 per cent between 2002 – 2006 and 2007 – 2011. The dominant supplier was Russia, with 
a 78 per cent share, followed by Belarus and Iran.   
 
The Arms Trade as Profit for Second-Tier States 
The biggest exporters of arms include Russia, and this leads us to the question of profit as the 
primary motivation behind the arms trade. The following graph shows how much the Soviet 
Union/Russia has earned on their arms exports, indicating its relative importance.  
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Figure 1. Soviet/Russian arms trade revenues (SIPRI, 2013a). 
 
 
In the years of the Soviet Union the numbers, of course, include arms exports from other areas 
than today’s Russia, so the sharp decrease is not as dramatic as it seems. Still, it is possible to 
understand the trend of the total arms exports and the general decline following the end of the 
Cold War. What we can see from the graph is that Russia has experienced a steady increase of 
revenues from arms exports since the low point in the years following the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. It is difficult to judge from these numbers whether the Russian Federation is 
making more or less on arms export today than under the Cold War, but since the years before 
1991 include the whole Soviet Union, the Russian profits may be at approximately the same 
level. Some researchers, like Zakaria, Brooks and Wohlforth virtually brush aside the foreign 
policy aspect of Russia’s arms exports (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005, 2008; Zakaria, 2008). 
They argue that the Russians had to sell as much as they could, without limitation, just to 
survive, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although this was quite possibly the case 
in the 1990s, it is hard to believe that after a full decade, the quite capable industry has been 
unable to readjust and adapt to the new marked.  In addition, and maybe more convincing, is 
the graph showing that the Russian export revenues for the 2000s is much higher than for the 
1990s, suggesting a coherent release of the pressure to “sell anything to everyone”. Compared 
to the 1990s, the last year’s export numbers is doubled, with new records in 2011 and 2012  
(Reuters, 2012). With this clear increase, I argue that Moscow now have much more freedom 
to choose among possible buyers. My argument is supported by a U.S. government report 
acknowledging the Russian need to export for gaining revenues, “until now” (Blank, 2007: 1). 
Arms exports are again a Russian foreign policy tool. A further sign that the arms trade is now 
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part of Moscow’s foreign policy toolbox is the establishment of Rosoboroneksport, a 
government agency for arms export. By the start of the new millennia, Rosoboroneksport had 
full control and managed all arms exports from all private and state-owned weapons 
producers. And in 2006, the U.S. placed sanctions on Rosoboroneksport because of their new 
challenging trading policy (Blank, 2007: 1).  
 
The Chinese arms industry is far less export-oriented than Russia’s, geared as it is primarily 
on satisfying the demands of the People’s Liberation Army. However, the trends of the last 
decade indicate that this is about to change somewhat (See the Graph A1 in the appendix). 
The recent years’ steadily growing defence budget following a demand for military build-up 
and upgrade has sparked the significant growth of the indigenous Chinese arms industry, 
which is supplying more and more states. China’s general policy of not interfering with 
“internal issues” of other states might make Beijing a popular supplier in the years to come.  
 
China 
“Let China sleep, for when she wakes she will shake the world.” This quote is credited to 
Napoleon Bonaparte, but is repeated by many in our time. China is one of the major powers of 
the world today, and has the role of a second-tier state. The Global Trends report from the 
U.S. National Intelligence Council states, “Few countries are poised to have more impact on 
the world over the next 15-20 years than China”, and the report continues to warn that “U.S. 
security and economic interests could face new challenges if China becomes a peer 
competitor that is military strong as well as economically dynamic and energy hungry” (NIC, 
2008: 29). On one hand, China is an interesting object of study by virtue of being a significant 
purchaser of arms, and on the other hand it is also an important supplier of major conventional 
weapons. The following sections will deal with both of these aspects.  
 
Patterns of China’s Arms Trade 
Back in 1993 Waltz saw the importance of the arms trade when he considered the rise of 
China to future great power-status. For the persistence of U.S. primacy, he had scant faith.  
“Modernizing its three-million-strong army, buying ships and airplanes abroad and building its 
own as well, China will rapidly gain in power-projection capability. America, with the 
reduction of its forces, a Cold War-weary people, and numerous neglected problems at home, 
cannot hope to balance the growing economic and military might of a country of some 1.2 
billion people while attending to other security interests. Unless Japan responds to the growing 
power of China, China will dominate its region and become increasingly influential beyond it” 
(Waltz, 1993: 68). 
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Though there is uncertainty about the exact magnitude of the Chinese defence budget, it has 
almost certainly experienced a continuous double-digits growth for two decades. There is no 
doubt, in any case, that China is modernizing its military at great speed. The United States 
still spends about four-and-a-half times as much on defence as China does, but considering 
the growth rate of the Chinese budget, China will likely catch up with the U.S. around 2035 
(The Economist, 2012). Modernizing equipment and investing in new weapon systems gives 
the Chinese military new capabilities. “And as the wealth and power at its command have 
grown, Beijing has begun to exert increasing influence, both in Asia and around the world” 
(Friedberg, 2011: xv). As with the budgets, the strength of the dragon is growing. Analysts at 
Pentagon are concerned about Chinas acquisitions of anti-access/area denial weapons. With 
pinpoint ground-attack and anti-ship missiles, a growing fleet of modern submarines and 
cyber and anti-satellite weapons to destroy or disable another nation’s military assets from a 
distance, the People’s Liberation Army is no longer just that mass of people that it used to be 
(The Economist, 2012). The new assets of the Chinese forces means that the U.S. aircraft 
carrier groups in the western Pacific, and air force bases in Okinawa, South Korea and Guam 
can be targeted. The strategic aim of Beijing would be with its own military power to make 
U.S. power projection in Asia riskier and more costly, so that states in the region no longer 
can rely on it for total protection. With U.S. military power in the region challenged, China 
will be able to use its own power to coerce and make more credible threats towards regional 
states. If the U.S. military presence is seriously challenged, China might also be able to make 
good on its threats towards Taiwan, if the renegade island ever declares independence. It is 
important to note that China does not have to match the United States’ military power on a 
global scale in order to acquire more operational freedom; they only have to make a credible 
challenge in their own area of operation. If Beijing can dominate the so-called First and 
Second Island Chains, the U.S. would experience extensive operational and logistical 
challenges is the region (Knutsen, 2012: 20) . It is possible for China to outbalance the U.S. 
regionally without having the hegemonic power projection capabilities that the U.S. has. 
According to Dodge, this is exactly how Beijing has devised its security strategy (Dodge, 
2004).  
 
Beijing understands that gaining domination in regional waters can be attempted in a variety 
of ways, ranging from submarines to aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons. “In the end, the 
PRC has opted for very specific tactics and weapons systems designed to deter and defeat the 
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massive sea power of the United States while avoiding a similar investment in naval and air 
forces” (Dodge, 2004: 391). China realizes that it cannot match the full might of the U.S. 
military by upgrading and expanding its own capabilities to their level, it would be too 
expensive and take too much time. “Instead, China is pursuing a strategy which calls for the 
selective modernization and development of ‘pockets of excellence’ that will challenge the 
United States in an asymmetrical fashion” (Dodge, 2004: 391-392). Known as “limited 
deterrence” or “limited war under high tech conditions”, such forces will according to Dodge 
be a real challenge to the United States. A report to the U.S. Congress from the Congressional 
Research Service urges for the military to prepare for a more powerful Chinese navy and air 
force when making their own acquisition plans for the future (O´Rourke, 2005: 22).    
 
China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy 
According to RAND National Defense Research Institute, the dominating U.S sea power is 
under serious challenge in the Western Pacific. China is the challenger and the reason is that 
“China sees American sea power in East Asian waters as threatening to itself, its regional 
aspirations, and possibly its global access” (Gompert, 2013). So Beijing is mounting a 
challenge to U.S. naval supremacy, but not with the same assets. As mentioned earlier, China 
is in fact better off challenging the United States in East Asia with anti-ship missiles, 
submarines, specialized surface ship, surface-to-air missiles and airplanes (Knutsen, 2012: 
20). The researchers at RAND warn that, “History shows that rivalries between established 
and rising sea powers tend to end badly. In this case, technology that enables the targeting of 
surface ships, especially aircraft carriers, favors the challenger, China” (Gompert, 2013: 194). 
Beijing has in the last few decades brought considerable amounts of weaponry suited for 
countering U.S. naval power. The supplier par excellence has for a long time been Russia. 
Since 2000 Russia has supplied China with a broad array of weapon systems that can fulfill a 
role in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) operations. Examining all the Russian weapons sales 
to China between 2000 and 2012 reveals that most of the arms transferred may usefully be 
placed into this category. See the table A1 in the appendix for details of the relevant arms 
transfers between Russia and China. What the weapons are for is no secret, and of course 
Russia is well aware of how China attempt to constrain and challenge the U.S. in Asia. The 
continued export of advanced Russian arms implies that Moscow approves of the 
consequences. The U.S. Department of Defense especially lists ballistic and cruise missiles, 
as well as advanced air defenses, as anti-access/area denial weapons that will pose a challenge 
for the United States. China has successfully ordered 42 advanced air-defense systems and 
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literally thousands of missiles of different formats and capabilities (SIPRI, 2013a). In fact the 
U.S. DoD specifically warns China as a state that “will continue to pursue asymmetric means 
to counter our power projection capabilities” (Department of Defense, 2012: 4).  
 
The consequences of losing the edge on military power is not lost on the leaders in 
Washington, and the latest “Strategic Guidance” issued in January 2012 by the re-elected 
President Barack Obama and his Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta, stated that a shift of 
priorities towards Asia was overdue and under way. In the document labelled “Sustaining 
Global Leadership. Priorities for 21
st
 century Defence“, we can read that “while the U.S. 
military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward 
the Asia-Pacific region”(Department of Defense, 2012: 2). The strategic guidance document 
acknowledges that the military power hegemony in Asia is now entering a critical face of win 
or lose, and are suggesting actions accordingly. The U.S. is responding to the power shift in 
Asia. They expand their permanent bases in strategic areas like Guam, sign contracts for the 
leasing of supply-harbours in the region and tighten the military bonds with regional allies 
like Australia (Parry, 2012).  
 
China’s Arms Trade with Iran 
Interestingly, Beijing is not only representing a headache for U.S. military strategist and 
security officials by importing anti-access/area denial weapons, they are also exporting them. 
The Chinese arms industry is first and foremost fulfilling some of the demands from the 
People’s Liberation Army, and therefore has no real incentives to engage in export. But they 
still do, and one of the most significant cases is the trade with Iran. China has since 2000 
transferred substantial quantities of long range anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air weapon 
systems with accompanying missiles, and air search radars (SIPRI, 2013a). These arms 
transfers are significant for three reasons. The first is the strategic importance of the arms that 
can be described as anti-access/area denial weapons, especially considering the narrow waters 
of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. These waters are of extreme importance because of 
the great oil transports from the region. The second significantly reason is the obvious 
challenge to the U.S. represented by these sales to Iran. Being one of the few countries 
mentioned by name as a threat to the U.S. nation in the President’s annual defence report, 
supplying Iran with major weapon systems can be considered balancing against the United 
States (Department of Defense, 2012). The third reason is the strong international agreement 
on putting Iran under an arms embargo, and the subsequent result that almost no other state 
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will engage in arms deals with the theocratic republic. Iran is, in the eyes of the world 
community, a real pariah state, but even so, Beijing chooses to transfer arms to them.  
 
 
Proliferation of WMD and Missile Technology 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the missile technology that can 
deliver them, have long been a major concern of U.S. policy makers; in addition it has been a 
persisting concern that China has a considerable role in the matter (Friedberg, 2011). It is the 
national interest of the United States to reduce China’s role of in the proliferation of WMD 
and missiles that can deliver them (Kan, 2012). The U.S. State Department has confirmed that 
recipients of the Chinese arms include countries that support terrorism and are under arms 
embargoes, such as Iran and Sudan. The transfers of Chinese weapons and technology to 
unstable and potential hostile regimes and groups could pose a real security threat to the 
United States. It is confirmed that China has contributed to technical aid, local enhancement 
of capabilities, longer-range missiles, and arms transfers attempted camouflaged by the use of 
secondary states acting like front-men. China is reported to be a “key supplier” of technology 
providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology 
to Iran (Kan, 2012: II).  
 
If Washington were to interpret the mentioned actions as balancing behaviour against them, 
we ought to expect counteractions targeting Beijing. This is also what has happened. 
Reportedly because of the security concern, the U.S. government has tried to stop the Chinese 
weapon transfers by both punishing China with sanctions, convincing them at summits and 
rewarding them with exports of U.S. satellite technology. The Clinton Administration made a 
big effort trying to appease Beijing into promising missile non-proliferation. The Bush 
Administration obviously did not see the desired result, and imposed special sanctions on 20 
occasions for “troublesome” transfers including chemical weapons to Iran. Late in President 
Bush’s second period, the State Department waived the sanctions several times before 
permanently lifting them in late 2007. However, between 2009 and 2012 the Obama 
administration has imposed sanctions on ten occasions for arms transfers-related activities.  
 
For a long time the United States has relied on China’s influence on North Korea to dismantle 
its nuclear weapons. China did vote for some U.N Security Council sanctions against nuclear 
proliferation in North Korea, but Beijing has at the same time, presumably been the most 
    
41 
 
important arms supplier to North Korea (Kan, 2012: II). It is hard accurately to determine if 
the Chinese government’s proliferation of WMDs and missile technology is driven by a 
strategy of balancing or not, but with a realist approach it is unlikely that Beijing is doing it 
out of goodwill only. The question of profit is not as easily brushed aside, but considering the 
economy of the states on the receiving end of Beijing’s technology sharing – and, more 
importantly, China’s booming economy, which implies that the country at best only has a 
relatively minor need for making revenue with attached foreign misgivings – leaves few other 
grand strategies as credible explanations.  
 
Strategies and Motivations behind China’s Arms Trade 
In international politics and international relations there are some actions taken by leaders that 
are more important and more symbolic than others. For example, the first official visit a state 
leader takes abroad is important because it is customary to visit your best, most trusted and 
most important friend first. President Obama made his first visit outside of the U.S. to 
Canada, and, in his first overseas visit just two months after the inauguration, he went to Great 
Britain (CBSNews, 2009). The trip to London was a symbol of the special Anglo-Atlantic 
relationship. In 2013, the first foreign visit of the new leader in China, Xi Jinping, was to 
Russia, a trip  “giving the impression that the giant Asian neighbours were friends intent on 
broadening their strategic partnership” (Kotkin, 2013). President Xi met with the Russian 
military leadership in the Russian Armed Forces’ Operational Command Centre. He was the 
first foreign leader ever to visit the “heart” of the Russian military establishment (Guneev, 
2013). In spite of the two countries’ shared desire to change the current U.S.-dominated world 
order, they are also potential long-term rivals and have yet to sustain a working alliance. 
China seeks no assistance from Russia in the troubled South China Sea or in its dispute with 
Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In the case of North Korea, Moscow and Beijing 
have not been able to unite on a mutual plan of actions in the dealings with the Kims. But 
what ties them together, in addition to geography and autocratic rule, is their objection to U.S. 
primacy. The foreign policy strategies of both countries are indissolubly linked to the actions 
and strategies of the United States. Moscow and Beijing are equally concerned that policies 
calling for “universal human rights” – often promoted by Washington – are violating state 
sovereignty (not least their own). The two countries have also worked together against 
interventions in other states’ affairs as they see it, e.g. in UN discussions about the conflict in 
Syria. At a time when the U.S. is taking measures to reorder their security priorities with a so-
called “pivot” towards Asia, commentators have interpreted the new Chinese leader’s 
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decision to visit Russia first, as both a sign of friendship with Moscow, and as a gesture 
towards Washington. “China, after all, sees the pivot as menacing, despite American efforts to 
persuade it otherwise” (The Economist, 2013a).  Antagonists only a few decades ago, Russia 
and China now seems at remarkably good terms with each other. They both know through 
experience how draining hostile relations can be: Russia and China alike used to devote 
substantial forces for protection along their more than 4000km long common border. With 
their current (real or purely strategic) friendship, the military forces can be moved to where 
they are needed more. China is shifting the military might towards disputes with Taiwan and 
Japan. These areas are, however, protected by the United States, but Georgia was not.  
 
The seemingly cordial relationship between Russia and China is strained somewhat by 
Russian transfers of advanced weaponry to India and Vietnam, states that are not at the best 
terms with China. The most important, and for China the most offending Russian sales to 
India include the aircraft carrier ”Gorshkov”, the ballistic-missile-capable nuclear submarine  
Akula-2, the newest and most advanced anti-ship missiles, and their latest combat aircraft. 
But despite Chinese anger over other Russian sales, and Russian frustration over Chinese 
reengineering and competition on the arms marked, Russia and China continues to make deals 
with advanced weapons (SIPRI, 2013a). The continued relationship with Russia is important 
to Beijing because when they in 2005 passed an “anti-secession” law, threatening Taiwan 
with military force if it took action even resembling that of independence, the EU and others 
postponed its planned lift of the arms embargo on China (Zakaria, 2008: 123).  
 
In 2004 China released a new Defence White Paper marking a change in Chinese foreign 
policy to a more overt challenging response to the United States. The White Paper sets the 
standard for development effectively becomes the guide for acquiring new weapons. The 
document proclaim that “factors of uncertainty, instability and insecurity are on the increase”, 
and “new and profound readjustments have taken place in the relations among the world’s 
countries,” concluding that “the balance of power among the major international players” are 
undergoing fundamental changes. The Chinese maintain that they expect struggle for strategic 
points and resources. Because of this, “the military factor plays a greater role in international 
security”, they say (China, 2004). With the focus of the importance of military capabilities in 
an international strategic struggle, the paper in fact gives the arms trade a more important role. 
Most interestingly, the 2004 paper for the first time instructs the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) to set on a course for creating a force structure capable of "winning both command of 
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the sea and command of the air" (China, 2004). Command of the sea and the air is effectively 
the modern equivalent of the century old concept of ‘command of the commons’. The concept 
refers to having superior military force in international waters, and in modern terms also the 
skies. Command of the commons were formulated to be a national strategy by the U.S. naval 
officer Mahan (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2006; Mahan, [1890] 1987). Also, Kennedy has argued 
the importance of “naval mastery” (Kennedy, 1976).  
 
According to Posen command of the commons is the key military enabler for the United 
States position as world hegemon (Posen, 2003: 9). Command of the commons has allowed 
the United States to wage war on short notice even in areas far from permanent military bases. 
When Beijing state the need for military power capable of "winning both command of the sea 
and command of the air" (China, 2004), it is a direct challenge to the current hegemony of the 
United States. China is preparing for stepping up as a regional power with the military 
capabilities to challenge the U.S. Navy in home waters, much in the same way that the U.S. 
successfully counterbalanced the British Royal Navy in the Pacific Ocean during the war in 
early 1800ed.  
 
Holmes and Yoshihira maintain that the thoughts of the former U.S. strategist Mahan now are 
central in Chinas military strategy. The researchers deduce three points from Maham’s work 
that will shape Beijing’s understanding of Asia’s commons. First, it is imperative to maintain 
the flow of seaborne resources and commerce. Secondly, it is important to establish naval 
stations close to the major sea-lanes that are far from China’s mainland. And thirdly, it is 
imperative to wield naval forces sufficient to defeat the largest concentration of such forces 
likely to contest China’s role in the East-Asian waters (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2006: 173). 
Embracing the zero-sum thinking about naval power to claim control of the modern 
commons, means that China has to enlarge and upgrade its military forces at great paste. 
Consequently, China is dependent of arms transfers from other states in addition to its own 
arms industry. However, this is in poor shape. Again, this shows the relative importance of the 
arms trade. Beijing understand how skewed the military balance towards the United States is. 
Accordingly, China will, and indeed are, investing heavily in anti-access/area denial 
capabilities that are specially designed to hinder and erode U.S. military supremacy in ways 
that are both economically and politically cost efficient.  
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Brooks and Wohlforth argues there are no real balancing behaviour from the second-tier 
powers against the United States, and finds the Russian arms sales to China to be motivated 
by profit, not policy (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005: 87). Art argues that there is signs of 
balancing action because “Russia is aware of the effects of its arms sales on China’s military 
capability” (Art, Brooks, Wohlforth, Lieber, & Alexander, 2005: 178). I agree with Art, 
maintaining that it is possible for Russian policy makers to follow two thoughts 
simultaneously, and thus selling arms to China for profit and balancing.  Brooks and 
Wohlforth maintain that even though it is quite obvious that China buys advanced Russian 
weapons to improve their position in the Taiwan Strait and as a direct response to the U.S. 
military support of the disputed island, it is not a case of balancing. Because the situation of 
the Taiwan Strait dates back to 1949, it has no relevance to the current hegemony of the 
United States, they argue (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005: 87). I disagree with this assertion 
because maintaining that military balancing is not balancing simply because it involves 
balancing against actions with long traditions, seems to be a poor argument bordering on 
truism. The fact is that Russia is supplying China – a military ally – with advanced weapons 
that according to researchers (Bukkvoll, 2011; Gompert, 2013; Knutsen, 2012) as well as U.S. 
authorities (Department of Defense, 2012) are challenging the United States’ ability to sustain 
global leadership. The economic analysis shows that Russia no longer have to sell “everything 
to everyone to survive”, and Russia is consistently supplying China with weapon systems that 
no one else is willing to supply to China, even when Russian military leaders express concern 
over losing the edge in military technology and capabilities. This checks several boxes in 
Pape’s definition of hard balancing (Pape, 2005: 9). Therefore I agree with Art (Art et al., 
2005), who maintain that we cannot dismiss a balancing motive, because there is no doubt 
that Kremlin knows what their weapons are doing to the military balance in East Asia. Also, it 
has to be noted, in defence of Brooks and Wohlforth, that their statement were published in 
2005, which is now eight years ago – and much has happened since then – and Russia’s 
motives may very well have changed with the growing Russian power and assertiveness.  
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Russia 
“I would like to say these mechanisms are really a good means of defence, a reliable defence 
against attacks from the air or sea. This is not a threat, but whoever is planning an attack 
should think about this” (Isaykin, General Director of Rosoboroneksport) (Kramer, 2012).  
 
Patterns of Russia’s Arms Trade 
The Russian Federation has since the time of the Soviet Union been one of the major 
exporters of arms. Naturally the post-Cold War Russia were marked by its Soviet past, and 
much of the Russian arms sales of the 1990s were really about selling off some of the huge 
stockpiles of arms, which in the new world were not seen as essential for Russia’s own 
survival. But then again it is important not to underestimate the capabilities of the Soviet 
weaponry after all it had just about matched the west. After some troublesome years of 
restructuring and “capitalist shock-therapy” Russia were, to a certain extent at least, back on 
its feet again, and government and privately owned defence companies started to focus and 
invest in research and development. This had a major impact on the arms industry, because 
once again Russian arms could compete with the best of the West. Especially in the areas of 
combat aircraft, submarines and surface-to-air missiles, Russia today distinguishes itself as a 
major actor in weapons design and development.  
 
For 2012, SIPRI places Russia as the biggest supplier in the global arms trade (Holtom, 
Bromley, Wezeman, et al., 2012). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which also marked a 
precipitating fall in the arms trade, the first years of the new millennium followed a steady 
growth of the Russian weapons exports. Although the share of the global market remained 
roughly the same, the volume of the Russian arms trade rose with 14 per cent in the period 
2004-2008 compared to 1999 -2003 (Bromley et al., 2009). For the period 2007-2011 Russian 
arms exports increased again, this time with twelve per cent. Traditionally India and China 
has been the biggest importers of Russian arms. To some extent the Russian arms costumers 
of today can be seen as a continuation of the political and military allies of the former Soviet 
Union. It is also important to remember that for states that don’t feel comfortable paying for 
and using American or western weapons, there really are not that many alternatives. Some 
states have special relationships with Russia that makes it natural to include military 
cooperation and arms deals that further tightens the bond. Often these states can be Russian 
allies “inherited” from the Soviet Union. An example is Algeria, whose history includes 
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strategic cooperation with the Soviet Union. Russia has continued to be their favoured arms 
supplier.  
 
Russia’s Arms Trade to Syria 
Another interesting example is Syria. The Kingdom of Syria was, like Algeria a part of the 
Soviet sphere of influence. Over two years after the start of the Syrian uprising and revolution 
following the “Arab spring”, Moscow is soon the only outspoken supporter of the Assad 
regime. If we look at the trade records, Russia has sold a good deal of weaponry to Syria since 
2000. But again, the quantity is not as interesting as the quality of the arms delivered. In this 
case, the timing is also important. To prepare his government and armed forces to stop an 
uprising, one would believe that Bashar al-Assad would order tanks, armoured fighting 
vehicles and guns to supress the people. These weapons worked well (for a time) for 
Muammar Gaddafi, and combined with combat aircraft, he nearly put down the revolution in 
Libya. In the end Gaddafi lost, but this was because of the multinational military intervention 
that effectively stopped the government forces from the air in bombing campaigns (Norton-
Tylor, 2011). And here lays the clue to understanding the importance of the Russian arms 
trade to Syria. For Gaddafi’s regime was not overrun by rebel’s small arms, but by (mostly 
Western) foreign aircraft. To put it simply, Assad has for the last years ordered weapons not 
to stop rebels, but to stop an invasion. No orders of Russian tanks, but new advanced weapons 
systems for air and coastal defence. For example, the last batch of a total of 50 Pantsyr-
S1mobile air defence systems will be delivered from Russia by 2013. Moreover, Damascus 
has invested in 150 advanced, both short range and long range, air-to-air missiles. These 
orders were made after it was clear what the Arab spring could achieve (SIPRI, 2013a). When 
we know that none of the rebels in Syria has any aircraft, the question is what is Assad going 
to use anti-air missiles for? Along with advanced surface-to-air, air-to-air, and anti-ship 
missiles, combat aircraft, the air defence systems are likely to deter the same military 
intervention that stopped the Libyan regime. Today, after the last years of Russian arms 
transfers to Syria, a military intervention like that in Libya would prove much more difficult 
against Assad. The U.S. Joint Chiefs General Dempsey stated that the Russian transfer of the 
so-called “ship-killer” missiles to Syria  were "ill-timed" and "very unfortunate", signifying 
the U.S. feeling of the matter (Voice of America, 2013). Between 2008 and 2013 only Russia 
and Iran sold arms to Syria (SIPRI, 2013a). Russia’s arms transfers to Syria during the on-
going conflict have triggered the coldest words between the United States and Russia, since 
secretary of State Hillary Clinton pressed the reset button in Moscow as a sign of new and 
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improved U.S.-Russia relations following the installation of the first Obama administration. It 
was also Clinton that last year accused Russia for willingly prolonging the civil war in Syria 
with their weapons transfers (Stearns, 2012).  
  
Russia’s Arms Trade to China 
Perhaps the most significant Russian arms transfers, however, are those that have gone to 
China. These are also some of the most interesting when analysing possible balancing 
behaviour. Just concerning transfers in the period from 2000 to 2012, Russia has sold to China 
a quite substantial quantum of arms. Though the sheer amount may be interesting in by itself, 
the real importance lies in the specific of the weapons and their particular capabilities. For the 
Russo-Chinese arms trade of the new millennium is marked by quite a selective shopping by 
the Chinese which seem to order advanced weapons with specific capabilities they cannot get 
elsewhere. I have analysed all the arms transferred from Russia to China from 2000 to 2012 
and considered their relevance to the question of balancing. The relevant sales, which proved 
to be the majority, was subsequently added up and categorized according to weapon type and 
area of application, see table A1 in the appendix. When looking at the list of arms ordered by 
China, we immediately notice the lack of vehicles and ordinary conventional weapon systems 
like cannons and mortars. China have only ordered advanced weapons that are beyond the 
know-how of their own arms industry, that have anti-access/area denial capabilities or that 
will help China develop their own weapons systems into these capabilities. For China to 
acquire these weapons, which are specialized in obstructing the power projection of other 
states, is a major concern for the U.S. Department of Defense. To overcome this challenge is 
highlighted as a primary mission for the U.S. Armed Forces (Department of Defense, 2012). 
The Project-636E/Kilo Submarine is a typical example of a weapon system with anti-
access/area denial capabilities. This is a medium-sized diesel-electric submarine with the 
possibility to be equipped with anti-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, mines and six torpedo 
tubes capable of multiple torpedo variants. They are designed mainly for anti-surface and 
anti-submarine operations. Moscow has since 2000 supplied Beijing with eight of these 
submarines, and the latest torpedoes and missiles that can be fired from them (SIPRI, 2013a). 
Because they are quite small, the submarines can be hard to detect and they can operate close 
to land and in shallow waters – which makes them perfectly suited for China’s island coast 
(Sinodefence, 2013). U.S. officials confirm that these vessels produce a considerable threat to 
both U.S. military and civilian assets, and that the navy have started several projects to learn 
how this threat can best be countered (Erwin, 2004).  
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Together with 233 combat aircraft, several thousand advanced missiles for air and ground 
attack have been transferred from Russia to China in the period between 2000 and 2012. 
These missiles give both Russian-purchased and Chinese-produced aircraft improved 
capabilities. In addition, the technology transfers (and the possibility for reverse engineering) 
help China develop its own self-sufficient arms industry. There is already evidence of 
“considerable, on-going Russian technology transfer in the designs of [lots of] indigenously 
built Chinese military hardware” (Lague, 2008).  
 
Since the massacre on Tiananmen Square in 1989, Western states have held various arms 
embargoes on China. In fact, it has first and foremost been the Russian willingness to supply 
the weapons that has enabled China to balance other military powers in the region, like 
Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. “With sustained, double-digit annual increases in defence 
spending, China is increasingly seen as a potential rival to the United States, the dominant 
military power in East Asia” (Lague, 2008).  
 
Russia’s Arms Trade to Iran 
There are several foreign policy areas that strain the Russian-U.S. relationship. One of them is 
the respective states’ association with Iran. The common history of the United States and Iran 
tell a story of growing differences, the U.S. policy of containing the Islamic revolution and a 
series of foreign policy conflicts. Moscow does not share the same view on Iran as 
Washington, however, and has often treated Iran as a helpful if perhaps troublesome ally and 
an important regional actor. Both Russia and Iran share a common dislike of U.S. power and 
influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. Moscow has at times deliberately enhanced the 
relationship with Teheran as a way of pressuring the United States (Mankoff, 2012:124). In 
cases like the Iranian nuclear and missile programs, Russia’s foreign policy towards Iran is of 
utmost importance to the United States. Iran is one of Russia’s major costumers for industrial 
goods and major conventional weapons, but in 2005 both the United States and Israel 
protested loudly when Russia signed a contract for the delivery of the advanced S-300 
surface-to-air missile system. If the delivery had been made, it is likely to have severely 
weakened the credibility of an Israeli or U.S. airstrike within Iranian territory. When the 
transfer at the end was cancelled, it was because of hard pressure from both the United States 
and Israel.  
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While some arms transfers never reached Iran, others did. From 2000 to 2012, Russia sold 
large quantities of weapons that stand out as interesting because of their capabilities and the 
fact that, given the existence of strict arms embargoes on Iran, no one else are willing to 
supply the regime with these kinds of weapons (SIPRI, 2013a). Teheran has to a large extent 
acquired the same types of weapon systems as China. In addition to helicopters and combat 
aircraft, Russia has delivered air search radar systems and surface-to-air missile systems to 
Iran. The aircraft were delivered with accompanying advanced air-to-air missiles, and the Tor 
mobile anti-air systems with a large number of Gauntlet missiles. These missiles are of a 
newer and upgraded version of the once credited of downing a Russian Tupolev strategic 
bomber in the 2008 South Ossetia War (Chang, 2008). Accordingly, this is a very capable 
weapon system, and since the missiles can also target vehicles on ground or at sea – and 
intercept cruise missiles – the U.S Navy and Air Force is rightly concerned. These arms can 
be considered anti-access/area denial weapons, weapons feared by Pentagon (Department of 
Defense, 2012). Missile technology is one of the major focus points for the embargoes 
targeting Iran, so Russia could quite easily have declined the orders. Instead Moscow delivers 
no less than 750 Gauntlet missiles to Teheran in just a two year period (SIPRI, 2013a).   
 
There is no doubt that a nuclear-armed Iran would represent a greater threat to the United 
States than to Russia, and therefore it is no surprise to see Moscow handle the question of 
Iran’s nuclear program with more flexibility and indulgence than Washington. Moscow has 
also to a large extent resisted the pressure from the United States to stop its involvement in the 
nuclear program and other weapon programs in Iran (Mankoff, 2012: 124-125). The Russian 
actions in relations with Iran reflect the main principles of Russian foreign policy under both 
Putin and Medvedev. After the war in Georgia it became clear that even if the relations with 
the U.S. were reset in 2008 with the first Obama administration, there would be no real 
change in the Russian foreign policy. Russia were condemning U.S. unipolarity, but also 
emphasizing Russia’s interest in friendly relations with all nations, including the U.S., as long 
as they recognize Russia’s role as a major player and power in international relations, and 
Russia’s rights in its regions of special interest (Mankoff, 2012: 130). In this policy, the arms 
trade proves to be a smart tool for balancing.  
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Strategies and Motivations behind Russia’s Arms Trade 
Russia’s grand strategy has for a long time been to pursue cooperation with the United States 
as long as this does not compromises their ambitions as a great power in a prospective 
multipolar world.  In his excellent book on Russian foreign policy, Jeffrey Mankoff shows 
how the old super power has reintroduced great power politics as their basis for foreign policy 
strategy (Mankoff, 2012). This can explain some of the strategies and motivations behind 
Russia’s arms transfers in the twenty-first century. The contemporary policy of who Russia is 
trading with, and what they are trading, can be of great interest of many states. Of all of its 
neighbours, time has shown China to be the country whit the highest stake in Russian arms 
trade policy. Russia and China have long had a complicated relationship ranging from 
military conflict to a security cooperation pact, and arms transfers have been a part of all this. 
When the Russian military-industrial complex faced major challenges as a consequence of 
negligible orders from own military just after the disorganization of the Soviet Union, the 
purchases by the Chinese military forces were highly welcomed. Russia’s relationship with 
China is also influenced by how constrained the growing China feel by the world that the 
United States is leading. The two nations have followed common cause on a range of cases 
from the war in Iraq to the presence of U.S. forces in Central Asia. One might say that the 
Sino-Russian relationship is a reaction to their respective contemporary U.S. relationships.  
 
For a long time the arms industry and trade has been a favoured area of cooperation between 
China and Russia. It is largely China that buys and Russia that sells, but the large Chinese 
orders make it possible for further Russian research and development, which in turn give 
China access to military technology that it would not have got otherwise. But however cordial 
the relationship between the two states from time to time may be, it has never eliminated the 
deep-rooted fear that many in Russia feel about their giant neighbour. Many Russians view 
with scepticism China’s fast growth in economy and power, perhaps cognizant of the time 
when the Sino-Soviet/Russian relations were marked by competition opposed to cooperation. 
Many Russian intellectuals observe that China has a much bigger potential than any other 
state in Asia, its population and economy clearly dwarf Russia’s. What the two nations have 
in common, though, is a sense of being natural partners in the quest for establishing a 
multipolar world. China is a large and growing power, and is feeling uneasy about western 
hegemony in the world (Friedberg, 2011). Moscow and Beijing have often found it 
appropriate to cooperate in checking the exercise of U.S. power.  
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Russian fears of renewed rivalry with its neighbour, combined with a Chinese desire to 
become more self-reliant, have led both states to re-consider the extensive arms trade between 
the two states. A serious halt in the Russian arms transfers to China could hinder the Asian 
state in its continuing process of military modernization. However, the belief in China’s own 
military industry’s ability to successfully develop and produce the advanced technological and 
engineering solutions needed to check the Russian or American hardware, is quite low among 
most military experts at this point. In the first years of the new millennium, the Russian 
economy was expanding and growing steadily, which also impacted the Sino-Russian arms 
trade because the Russian export economy was no longer dependent of the consistent and 
large weapons orders from Beijing. Without the same economic pressure it is safe to surmise 
that the Russian leaders had a larger opportunity to be more selective in the dealings with 
China, and to take other foreign policy considerations into account. Also China’s impressing 
ability to copy and consequently self-produce foreign technology is increasingly making the 
Russians think twice about advanced arms transfers to Beijing. On their hand, Beijing is 
uneasy about Moscow’s sales to India.    
 
One of these contracts it the fifth-generation fighter aircraft that is planned in Russia. Moscow 
and New Delhi have agreed to cooperate in the development of this highly advanced fighter, 
and signed the deal in late 2008. Defence analysts say that the so-called fifth-generation 
fighter aircraft will rival in performance to the F-22 Raptor, the most advanced fighter 
currently in U.S. service. Interestingly the prestigious U.S. F-35 Lightning is also designated 
as a fifth-generation fighter. The U.S. government has only allowed sales of the F-35 
Lightning to close and particularly important allies. Outside of the NATO-organization, only 
Japan, Australia and Israel, which the United States sees as fundamentally important regional 
allies, have been able to successfully place orders. So, the only Asian state to join the 
prestigious U.S. programme is Japan. This is surely seen as a disappointment by more than 
just Lockheed Martin, the American production company, for although these matters are 
treated with some secrecy, it is quite clear that the U.S. State Department had cleared more 
countries as buyers. It is confirmed that India were offered the deal, but they declined, with a 
senior defence ministry official stating, “We cannot have two types of fifth generation fighter 
aircraft. We have already inked the $295 million preliminary design contract for this type of 
aircraft with Russia” (Times of India, 2011). It looks like Russia has got the edge on the 
United States in terms of making bonds with India. The loss of contract for the fifth-
generation fighter is, of course, a blow to the U.S. arms industry and economy, because the 
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deal is India’s biggest-ever defence project. Perhaps more importantly still, it represents a loss 
of opportunity to develop diplomatic and military ties with a great power in a region where 
the United States would like to make new friends. Wohlforth notes that over all, U.S. 
influence is strengthened by the presence of regional powers. If, for example, China rises to 
challenge the United States, it will not do so effectively if their strong neighbour India forms 
an official alliance with Washington (Wohlforth, 1999). With an extensive partnership based 
on arms trade and development, Moscow may convince New Delhi to do otherwise.  
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Chapter 5: Concluding Summary 
This thesis set out to investigate if the second-tier states use arms exports to balance against 
the United States’ hegemony. As we have seen, some scholars lean on balance of threat 
theories to show that the other states perceive the United States as a benevolent or at least 
non-threatening hegemon. Other scholars argue that the other state’s perceptions of its intent 
do not matter because the United States is practically immune to counterbalancing due to its 
overwhelming military and economic power. Other states do not enjoy the opportunity to 
balance against the U.S., they argue. Such arguments do receive some support, for, contrary to 
the early post-Cold War predictions from balance of power theorists, unipolarity still exists. 
“No new great power have emerged to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by 
engaging in hard balancing against the United States – at least, not yet” (Layne, 2006b: 37).  
 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons has dramatically reduced the utility of war as a policy 
tool. “Thus manoeuvre, diplomacy, coalition-building, co-operation, and the very deliberate 
deployment of one’s political assets have become the key ingredients of the successful 
exercise of geostrategic power” (Brzezinski, 1997: 36). Or, as Waltz would say, “Nuclear 
weapons alone do not make states into great powers” (Waltz, 1993: 52). To project power, 
and the ability to deny power projection with hard power, will still be important for the years 
to come. It is uncertain whether the arms trade of the second-tier states in general should be 
labelled as hard or soft balancing, but it is certain that the second-tier states are transferring 
weapons to each other and to third parties; in spite of the clear harmful effect this has on the 
interests of the United States and its effort to sustain global hegemony. In my analysis I used 
the definitions of Pape, who maintain that military alliances and “transfers of military 
technology to U.S. opponents” should be viewed as hard balancing” (Pape, 2005: 9), while 
soft balancing is “actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that 
[…] frustrate, and undermine […] U.S. military policies” (Pape, 2005: 10).  
 
Of the second-tier states that are likely to engage in balancing behaviour against the U.S., 
Russia and China clearly stand out. The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 
China also distinguished themselves with a willingness to transfer strategically important 
arms to states that are to be considered challenging to the United States. I believe that this 
thesis has shown that the connection between challenging arms trade and balancing position is 
no coincidence. No other states are to the same extent trading major conventional arms with 
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China, Syria, Iran, Venezuela, Sudan and the like. And no other states than Russia and China 
are transferring advanced potentially game-changing weapons systems to these states. Some 
researchers (e.g. Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005, 2008; Zakaria, 2008) have previously argued 
that the sales to these states have shown no signs of balancing, but rather a desperate need for 
revenue. The argument of arms trade for profit are often the basic understanding of the 
modern arms trade, but then again many seem to forget how strategically and politically 
important the arms trade have been throughout history. At the start of the empirical analysis 
the argument of profit as the only explanation for Russia’s and China’s arms trade to 
challenging states, was found to be insufficient to explain the arms transfers in the new 
millennium. Because of the economic development in the two states, there were, and indeed 
are, no longer the same desperate needs for export revenues.  
 
Instead, the nature of the weapons transferred to states that are considered enemies or 
challenging to the U.S. suggests the use of the arms trade as a foreign policy balancing tool. 
Transferring military technology to formal allies is per definition hard balancing, and there 
are few other explanations for actively increasing the military capabilities of states like Iran 
and Syria. The global arms trade is generally motivated by supply and demand, but a state can 
still profit without dealing with Iran. After all, the whole arms industry of Western Europe 
and Northern America (the broad part of the world industry) is doing fine even if they do not 
sell to China, the state with the fastest growing defence budget (SIPRI, 2013b). Therefore 
Beijing and Moscow must harbour other motives for transferring arms to pariah states, some 
of whom are even under arms embargo. The loss of international standing and prestige that 
usually follows when effectively braking arms embargoes to supply a pariah state is no secret, 
so there must be a net gain somewhere that can explain why Russia and China are selling 
arms to states like Iran and Syria. The analysis showed that during the civil war, Assad’s 
regime ordered advanced air and costal missile batteries for territorial defence, rather than 
your usual “put-down-a-rebellion weaponry” that would be expected. But in fact, Moscow 
was supplying Damascus with arms to deter a possible multinational military intervention, 
having in mind what eventually stopped Muammar Gadhafi in Libya. My analysis of the 
Russo-Syrian arms trade was to a great extent confirmed by the general director of 
Rosoboroneksport. “These are a really good means of defence from air or sea. This is not a 
threat, but whoever is planning an attack should think about this”, he said in an interview. The 
arms shipments from Moscow will “undoubtedly” serve as a warning to Western countries 
contemplating an intervention. “Russia uses this as a form of deterrence in Syria – they show 
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other countries that they are more likely to suffer losses” (Kramer, 2012).  The Russian 
federal monopoly-company for arms export, Rosoboroneksport, had by the early 2000s full 
control of all arms exports from all private and state-owned arms producers, leaving no doubt 
that all Russian arms sales to foreign clients since 2000 is sanctioned.  
 
This leads us to Moscow’s extended arms trade with Beijing. Just concerning transfers in the 
period from 2000 to 2012, Russia has sold to China a quite substantial quantum of arms. 
Though the sheer amount may be interesting in and by itself, the real importance lies in the 
specific weapons themselves or their capabilities. The analysis showed that Beijing was 
ordering advanced anti-access/area denial weapons that are beyond the know-how of their 
own arms industry. For China to acquire these weapons, which are specialized in obstructing 
the power projection of other states, is a major concern for the Pentagon. The new assets of 
the Chinese forces mean that the U.S. aircraft carrier groups in the western Pacific, and air 
force bases in Okinawa, South Korea and Guam can be targeted. The strategic aim of Beijing 
would be with their own military power to make U.S. power projection in Asia riskier and 
more costly, so that states in the region no longer can rely on it for total protection. It is 
possible for China to outbalance the U.S. regionally without having the hegemonic power 
projection capabilities that the U.S. has. To overcome this challenge is a primary mission for 
the U.S. Armed Forces (Department of Defense, 2012). It is clear that the Russian arms 
transfers to China from the 2000s are much more than just profit. Though the extent of the 
cooperation is debated, Moscow and Beijing are in fact military allies trough the SCO. 
Considering balancing behaviour with the arms trade, China is also worth noticing as a 
supplier. Especially the trade with Sudan and Iran were in the analysis found to represent a 
general balancing behaviour. The analysis showed how Iran has successfully ordered anti-
access/area denial weapons from China. Beijing has since 2000 transferred substantial 
quantities of long range anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air weapon systems with accompanying 
missiles, and air search radars, to the theocracy strategically situated with a long coastline in 
the Persian Gulf (SIPRI, 2013a). Because of arms embargoes and the fact that Chinese arms 
industry is designed to produce these advanced weapons for its own forces and do not need 
export revenues to prosper, China’s arms trade with Iran are found to follow the motive of 
hard balancing.  
Another example of interesting motives behind the arms trade are the Russian sales to India. 
Here, Moscow is apparently working hard to nurture and enhance the relationship. There 
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seems to be no limit of what arms New Delhi can order from the remains of her old friend. 
One thing is selling a whole aircraft carrier (with accompanying combat aircraft and 
helicopters for anti-submarine warfare) or leasing a nuclear submarine, another is to offer this 
country (with whom Russia has no military alliance) a partnership in your own top-secret 
prestige-project developing a fifth-generation stealth combat aircraft.  The effort seems to 
have paid off for Kremlin, because when the United States approached to offer New Delhi a 
contract (of procurement) for the exclusive F35 fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA), all 
they got in reply was, “We cannot have two types of FGFA. We already have a contract with 
Russia” (Times of India, 2011). This was probably the exact answer that the Kremlin was 
hoping for. Another point that strengthens the argument that soft balancing is the motivation 
for Russia’s extensive sales to India is the fact that New Delhi already owes Moscow a 
substantial amount of money. It is estimated that the arms race between India and Pakistan, 
where the Soviet Union supplied India, left New Delhi with a total debt of $16 billion 
(Bridge, 2009). The Russians do not need to sell arms to India, but none the less they do. 
Considering the overall evidence, thus I interpret Moscow’s motivation of the arms trade with 
New Delhi as soft balancing against the influence of the United States.    
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Balancing With Arms Trade: The Results 
I argue that the arms trade of the second-tier states does function as a form of balancing 
strategy. It varies from case to case if this strategy can best be described as hard or soft 
balancing. The following table is a continuation of the one presented in the very start of the 
empirical analysis. The table shows all the states to which China and/or Russia have 
transferred substantial quantities of advanced strategically important weapon systems (like 
A2/AD), since 2000. I have categorized the cases into four colours of balancing ranging from 
red (clear hard balancing), to white (possible soft balancing).  
Table 4. Significant arms importers and their affiliation with the U.S. 
Country 
name 
Has acquired weapon systems 
of strategic importance from 
Russia or China between 2000 
and 2012 
Considered Challenging 
state by the United 
States  
Judgement of 
balancing 
behaviour 
China Yes Yes Hard 
Syria Yes Yes Hard 
Iran Yes Yes Hard 
Venezuela Yes Yes Hard 
Sudan Yes Yes Hard 
Belarus Yes Possibly Hard 
India Yes Possibly Soft 
Myanmar Yes Possibly Hard 
Algeria Yes Possibly Soft 
Armenia Yes Possibly Hard 
Azerbaijan Yes Possibly Hard 
Indonesia Yes Possibly Soft 
Viet Nam Yes Possibly Soft 
Bangladesh Yes No Possibly soft 
Pakistan Yes No Possibly soft 
 
All the five cases where China or Russia have transferred substantial quantities of major 
advanced and strategically important arms to states that are considered challenging states by 
the U.S., have been labelled as cases of hard balancing. These are cases where the arms 
transfers clearly represent a challenge to the United States’ ability to sustain global military 
hegemony. The arms transfers per se do not make the receiver immune to the U.S. military 
might, but they do place significant restraints on it. This is also confirmed by research 
(Bukkvoll, 2011; Knutsen, 2012) and acknowledged by the United States DoD (Department 
of Defense, 2012).  
 
The second category is marked as hard balancing in orange. This means that the states 
considered are supplied with advanced weaponry and are in a military alliance with the 
supplier, but without necessarily constituting a challenge to the United States. The third 
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category is labelled soft balancing because these states are not in any military alliance with 
China or Russia, but evidence suggests that Moscow and Beijing, respectively, are using the 
arms trade as a means to align with the considered states and out-manoeuvre the United States 
– resulting in strategic as well as political difficulties for sustaining global hegemony. The 
more prominent case is India, where Russia and the U.S. are competing for influence. Military 
relationships are an important factor in the overall relations between states, and for the last 
years Moscow has been much more successful than Washington. The last category of white 
cases is for the states that have no Russian/Chinese military alliance (on the contrary 
regarding Pakistan), but where the extent of the Russian/Chinese arms trade suggests possible 
attempts of soft balancing against U.S. influence. This is an area for continued research.  
 
The role of the arms trade in counterbalancing is controversial, and although there is little 
previous research arguing the arms trade is used to balance against the U.S., there is research 
concluding that it does not play a significant part. For example, Brooks and Wohlforth argue 
that the balance-of-threat theory fails to explain the Russo-Chinese arms trade. “The arms 
sales seems so significant because they come from Russia, suggesting interstate cooperation 
to balance U.S. capabilities” (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008: 77). I think that Brooks and 
Wohlforth miss the point that what kinds of weapon systems that are sold are more important 
than just the sheer numbers of them. Because some weapons are capabilities in their own 
right, their numbers are not the most important factor. The case of the Russo-Chinese arms 
trade is no doubt interesting because Russia is both the far largest supplier and sells the most 
advanced potentially game-changing weapon systems to China. The Russian export revenues 
for the 2000s is much higher than for the 1990s, suggesting a coherent release of the pressure 
to “sell anything to everyone”, as proclaimed by some previous research. Compared to the 
1990s, the last year’s export revenues is doubled, with new records in 2011 and 2012  
(Reuters, 2012). With this clear increase, I argue that Moscow now have much more freedom 
to choose among possible buyers. My argument is supported by a U.S. government report 
acknowledging the Russian need to export for gaining revenues, “until now” (Blank, 2007: 1). 
On top of this, Rosoboronexport, the federal agency for managing all arms exports were 
established by decree of the Russian President in 2000, putting all foreign arms transfers 
under direct control of the President’s Office (Clouet, 2007). Arms exports are again a 
Russian foreign policy tool.  
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Balancing in the Future 
This thesis argues the relevance of the arms trade of second-tier states for balancing against 
the hegemonic United States. However, it is important to note that the author does not argue 
that trading arms alone will create a multipolar world. Military capabilities are, after all, not 
all that matters. As Zakaria notes, “The military power of the United States is not the cause of 
its strength but the consequence. The fuel is the U.S. economic and technological base, which 
remains extremely strong (Zakaria, 2008: 182). But I have no doubt that the arms trade of the 
second-tier powers as analysed here, do matter, and that the United States is hindered, 
strained, exhausted and tested by the transfer of certain weapon systems to states challenging 
its global dominance. And importantly, arms trading are a tool well-suited for balancing 
strategies in today’s world. Because of the exceptional military hegemony of the United 
States, a direct hostile challenge would be suicide. To bypass this, Russia, is contesting U.S. 
unipolarity, but also emphasising Russia’s interest in friendly relations with all nations, 
including the U.S. (Mankoff, 2012: 130). In this policy, the arms trade proves to be a smart 
tool for balancing. I would like to see more research on the arms trade and its implications for 
balancing. It would be interesting to learn how the presence of certain arms can affect the 
establishment of multinational military interventions or wars. An analysis of how the arms 
trade to second-tier states affect the U.S. economically, due to defence spending, would also 
be interesting. To further understand the arms trade of the second-tier states would in my 
opinion be a valuable contribution to the research on balancing in the international world 
system.  
 
The future of U.S. hegemony is really about the question of how long the United States 
maintains its unipolar position. Do the benefits of preserving unipolarity outweigh the costs? 
(Beeson, 2004). Layne warns that “attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end 
by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the 
United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in wars that will reduce its 
power” (Layne, 2006b: 41).  If the U.S. has to fight several future wars to maintain global 
leadership, the arms trade of the second-tier states will to great extent reveal its importance. 
To put it simply, to attack an Iran armed with advanced Russian anti-air missiles is a bit like 
engaging a porcupine – you are certain to prevail eventually, but you know you are going to 
get hurt in the process. That is why most predators leave the porcupine alone.  
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The United States still spends about four-and-a-half times as much on defence as China does, 
but considering the growth rate of the Chinese budget, China will likely catch up with the 
U.S. around 2035 (The Economist, 2012). If Beijing continues their military build-up in the 
same rate as today, they could then have the military capabilities to challenge the U.S. Navy 
in home waters, much in the same way that the U.S. successfully counterbalanced the British 
Royal Navy in the Pacific Ocean during the war in early 1800ed. Maybe the United States 
should learn from history and follow Britain’s example on how to manage a rising power, an 
inevitable challenger to its own hegemonic position. After all, Britain accomplished to 
maintain a position as the leading world power for decades after it lost economic dominance. 
How Washington will respond is imperative for the transition of power to be peaceful or not. 
The British Empire first engaged in a war against the U.S., but soon changed their policy to 
accommodate itself to the rise of the United States rather than to contest it (Zakaria, 2008: 
177). This was the key to their continued power status, and although Britain may have been 
broken later on, it was never beaten and remains a great power to this day. Thanks to a 
combination of smart strategic outlook and good diplomacy, London made the transition 
much smoother than it could have been. Washington will in the coming years have to make 
some though decision on their future grand strategy.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Arms transfers From Russia to China, 2000-2012. 
 
  Table presenting relevant arms transfers from Russia to 
China in the period 2000 – 2012. Data from SIPRI World 
Arms Transfer Database 2012 
Number 
ordered 
Weapon designation / 
NATO-name 
Weapon description 
 Ships  
4 
 
 
 
8 
Sovremenny Destroyer  
 
 
 
Project-636E/Kilo 
Submarine 
Blue-water-ship, anti-air and anti-ship specialised destroyer 
equipped with missiles, torpedoes, guns as well as advanced 
target acquisition and control radar and sonar. Holds decoys 
and one Kamov Ka-27 anti-submarine warfare helicopter. 
Medium sized diesel-electric submarine equipped with anti-air 
missiles, anti-ship missiles and six torpedo tubes capable of 
multiple torpedo variants. 
 Missiles, torpedoes and 
guided munitions 
 
750 
 
3000 
RVV-AE/AA-12 Adder 
 
R-73/AA-11 Archer 
Beyond-visual-range missile for Su-27 and Su-30 combat 
aircraft. Advanced air-to-air missile.  
Short-range-air-to-air missile for Su-27 and Su-30 combat 
aircraft. 
300 
500 
300 
150 
200 
1047 
9M38/SA-11 Gadfly 
9M338/SA-15 Gauntlet 
48N6/SA-10D Grumble 
9M317/SA-17 Grizzly 
9M311/SA-19 Grison 
48N6E2/SA-10E 
Different versions of surface-to-air missiles for from ships, 
land-based anti-air systems, and vehicles.  
Capable of downing most combat aircraft. 
(1/13 Israel bombed a Hezbollah convoy in Syria believed to 
transport these missiles).  
100 
150 
75 
150 
125 
760 
Kh-29/AS-14 Kedge 
Kh-59ME/AS-18 Kazoo 
Moskit/SS-N-22 
3M-54 Klub/SS-N-27 
Kh-59MK/AS-18MK 
Kh-31A1/AS-17 
Different versions of anti-ship missiles for use from ships, 
land-based systems and combat aircraft.  
The Moskit has a range of 240 km. and a warhead of 320 kg,  
the Kh-31 can avoid radar and infrared detection, and the Kh-
59MK is a TV-guided cruise missile with 110 km. range. 
150 
150 
53-64 torpedo 
TEST-71 torpedo 
Torpedoes for use in submarines. Carried in almost all of 
China’s submarines for targeting surface ships. Guided or self-
seeking capabilities.  
1100 Krasnopol-M Laser-guided, fin-stabilized artillery shell. Intended to engage 
mobile and stationary high-value targets. 
1200 9M119/AT-11 Sniper Laser-guided anti-tank missile with range of 5000 m.  
 Radar   
6 
88 
100 
1 
20 
4 
Mineral/Band Stand 
MR-90/Front Dome 
Zhuk 
Zimei/Sea Dragon 
Fregat/Top Plate 
MR-123/Bass Tilt 
Sea search radar for Chinese produced naval ships. 
Fire control radar 
Combat aircraft radar 
Maritime patrol radar for balloon-surveillance of Taiwan Strait 
Air search radar for Chinese frigates 
Fire control radar 
 Aircraft   
208 
133 
Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H  
Su-27S/Flanker-B  
Helicopter 
Fighter/ground attack aircraft  
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100 
6 
9 
9 
Su-30MK/Flanker 
Il-76M/Candid-B 
Ka-27PL/Helix-A 
Ka-31/Helix  
 
Transport aircraft 
Helicopter designed for anti-submarine warfare. 
 Anti-air and cannon-
systemes 
 
92 
20 
4 
2 
16 
 
AK-630 30mm  
Tor-M1/SA-15  
S-300PMU-1/SA-20A 
S-300FM/SA-N-20 
S-300PMU-2/SA-20B 
  
Naval gun for Chinese produced destroyers 
Different stationary or self-propelled surface-to-air missile 
weapon systems for use on land or at sea. (Serbia shot down 
two helicopters and two aircraft including one stealth attack 
aircraft in the NATO-Serbian war. Georgia shot down four 
combat aircraft and one strategic bomber in the South Ossetia 
War of 2008 with earlier version of this system. Russia has 
complied with hard pressure not to sell to Iran). 
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Table A2: Arms transfers from Russia to Syria, 2010-2012. 
Number 
ordered 
Weapon designation / 
NATO-name 
Table presenting relevant arms transfers from Russia to 
Syria in the period 2011 – 2012. Data from SIPRI World 
Arms Transfer Database 2012 
 Aircraft   
36 Yak-130  Light combat aircraft 
 Anti-air and cannon-
systemes 
 
50 
8 
 
96K9 Pantsyr-S1 
9K40 Buk/SA-17  
  
Mobile Air defense system 
Surface-to-air system 
Different stationary or self-propelled surface-to-air missile 
weapon systems for use on land or at sea. (Georgia shot down 
four combat aircraft and one strategic bomber in the South 
Ossetia War 2008 with earlier version of this system. Russia 
has complied with hard pressure not to sell to Iran). 
 Missiles, torpedoes and 
guided munitions 
 
700 
160 
100 
100 
50 
9M311/SA-19 Grison  
9M317/SA-17 Grizzly 
KAB-500/1500  
R-73/AA-11 Archer 
RVV-AE/AA-12 Adder 
Surface-to-air missile 
Surface-to-air missile 
Guided Bomb 
SRAAM air-to-air missile For MiG-29 combat aircraft 
BVRAAM long-range missiles for combat aircraft 
Different versions of surface-to-air missiles for use from ships, 
land-based anti-air systems, and vehicles. Capable of downing 
most combat aircraft. (1/13 Israel bombed a Hezbollah convoy 
in Syria believed to transport these missiles). 
 
 
Graph A1: Total calculated revenues from arms exports in 
US$ m. for China in the period 1988-2012 
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